Republican Gains in 2022 Midterms Driven Mostly by Turnout Advantage

 

Rubén Weinsteiner

An examination of the 2022 elections, based on validated voters

We conducted this study to better understand which voters cast ballots in the 2022 midterm elections and how they voted. We also wanted to compare how turnout and vote choices differed from previous elections in 2020, 2018 and 2016. Measuring turnout among different groups in the electorate is challenging; it is particularly difficult to assess changes in turnout from election to election.

Panel data provides us a unique opportunity to study elections. By surveying the same people over time, we can more clearly see how differences in who stays home – and who turns out to vote –impacts each election. We can also measure how adults’ partisan voting preferences change (or do not change) between elections

For this study, we surveyed U.S. adults online on our nationally representative American Trends Panel (ATP). We verified their turnout in the four general elections using commercial voter files that aggregate publicly available official state turnout records. Panelists who said they voted and for whom a voting record was located are considered validated voters; all others are presumed not to have voted.

Additionally, we revised our statistical approach for the 2020 survey. That produced new results that slightly changed the numbers we reported about the 2020 election but changed no substantive findings in our report.


American Trends Panel: MARCA POLITICA'S online probability survey panel, which consists of more than 12,000 adults who take two to three surveys each month. Some panelists have been participating in surveys since 2014.

Defectors/Defection: People who either switch their vote to a different party’s candidate from one election to the next, or those who in a given election do not support the candidate of the party they usually support. Also referred to as “vote switching.”

Drop off/Drop-off voters: People who vote in a given election but not in a subsequent election. The term commonly refers to people who vote in a presidential election but not in the next midterm. It can also apply to any set of elections.

Midterm elections: General elections held in all states and the District of Columbia in the even-numbered years between presidential elections. All U.S. House seats are up for election every two years, as are a third of U.S. Senate seats (senators serve six-year terms).

Mobilize: Efforts by candidates, political campaigns and other organizations to encourage or facilitate eligible citizens to turn out to vote.

Nonvoter: Citizens who didn’t have a record of voting in any voter file or told us they didn’t vote.

Panel survey: A type of survey that relies on a group of people who have agreed to participate in multiple surveys over a time period. Panel surveys make it possible to observe how individuals change over time because the answers they give to questions in a current survey can be compared with their answers from a previous survey.

Party affiliation/Party identification: Psychological attachment to a particular political party, either thinking of oneself as a member of the party or expressing greater closeness to one party than another. Our study categorizes adults as Democrats or Republicans using their self-reported party identification in a survey.

Split-ticket voting/Straight-ticket voting: Voters typically cast ballots for more than one office in a general election. People who vote only for candidates of the same party are “straight-ticket” voters, while those who vote for candidates of different parties are “split-ticket” voters.

Turnout: Refers to “turning out” to vote, or simply “voting.” Also used to refer to the share of eligible adults who voted in a given election (e.g., “The turnout in 2020 among the voting eligible population in the U.S. was 67%”).

Validated voters/Verified voter: Citizens who told us in a post-election survey that they voted in the 2022 general elections and have a record for voting in a commercial voter file. (The two terms are interchangeable).

Voter file: A list of adults that includes information such as whether a person is registered to vote, which elections they have voted in, whether they voted in person or by mail, and additional data. Voter files do not say who a voter cast a ballot for. Federal law requires states to maintain electronic voter files, and businesses assemble these files to create a nationwide list of adults along with their voter information.

In midterm elections that yielded mixed results for both parties, Republicans won the popular vote for the U.S. House of Representatives largely on the strength of higher turnout.

A new Pew Research Center analysis of verified voters and nonvoters in 2022, 2020, 2018 and 2016 finds that partisan differences in turnout – rather than vote switching between parties – account for most of the Republican gains in voting for the House last year.

Overall, 68% of those who voted in the 2020 presidential election turned out to vote in the 2022 midterms. Former President Donald Trump’s voters turned out at a higher rate in 2022 (71%) than did President Joe Biden’s voters (67%).

For additional analysis of voter turnout in the 2022 election, refer to Chapter 1 of this report.
Large majority of voters stuck with 2020, 2018 party preference in their 2022 vote choices

As in previous elections, party loyalty remained strong in last fall’s midterms.

Relatively small shares of voters defected from their partisan affiliation or 2020 presidential vote. Among those who voted for both president in 2020 and for a House representative in 2022, just 6% crossed party lines between elections or voted for third-party candidates in either election.

Similarly, the vast majority of those who voted in both 2018 and 2022 had consistent party preferences across the two elections: 95% of those who voted for a Republican candidate in 2018, and 92% of those who voted for a Democrat, voted for a House candidate of the same party four years later.

Democratic 2018 voters were slightly more likely than Republican 2018 voters to defect in 2022, with the net consequences of the party balance flipping 1 or 2 percentage points to the GOP.

That is a potentially impactful shift in an environment of very close elections, but the greater driver of the GOP’s performance in 2022 was differential turnout: higher turnout among those supporting Republican candidates than those supporting Democratic candidates.

Given sharp political divisions in the United States, small changes in voter turnout from election to election have big consequences. Political polarization has meant that most people who vote in midterm elections are committed politically, making it unlikely they would defect from their partisan affiliation.

Shifts in turnout, as opposed to defections, were responsible for most of the changes in vote margins from the 2018 midterms within most subgroups in the population. For example, the Democratic advantage among women dropped from 18 points in 2018 (58% Democratic, 40% Republican) to just 3 points in 2022 (51% and 48%, respectively).

But when looking only at women who voted in both elections, there is no net advantage for either party from defections: 6% of those who voted Democratic in 2018 flipped to vote for a Republican candidate in 2022, and a nearly identical share of women who voted Republican in 2018 voted for a Democratic candidate in 2022 (5%).

Virtually all of the decline in the Democratic advantage among women is explained by the fact that the 2022 turnout rate for women who voted Republican in 2018 was 8 points higher than the rate for women who voted Democratic that year (84% vs. 76%).

There were a few important exceptions to this general rule.

For example, more rural voters changed their vote from a Democratic to a Republican candidate between 2018 and 2022 than the reverse. The Republican margin among this group nearly doubled between 2018 and 2022 (from 21 points to 40 points). Among rural voters, Republican candidates in 2022 held on to 97% of those who voted Republican in 2018, while Democratic candidates held on to a smaller share (91%).

And among White voters with no college degree, Republicans benefited from slightly higher rates of defection from Democratic candidates among those who voted in both elections

Chapter 2 of this report features detailed breakdowns of voting patterns across the electorate.
‘Drop-off’ voters contributed to Republican House gains

Collectively, Republican candidates for the House received roughly 51% of the total vote last fall compared with 48% for Democratic candidates. This helped the Republican Party gain a narrow majority in the House. Democrats retained control of the Senate. While Republicans exceeded expectations in a few states – notably New York and Florida – pre-election predictions of a “red wave” failed to materialize.

However, the broad outcome of the elections in much of the country was shaped largely by the underlying political makeup of the 2022 voters and how they differed from the voters of 2020 and 2018.

Midterm voters tend to be older, more educated and more affluent than those who vote just in presidential election years, a pattern apparent in both 2018 and 2022. The two elections also had something else in common: The president’s party suffered more “drop-off” voters than did the opposing party.

People who voted in 2018 who did not turn out in 2022 (“drop-off” voters), had favored Democrats in 2018 by about two-to-one (64% to 33%). Likewise, about a third of 2020 voters (32%) did not turn out in 2022. This group voted 53% to 43% for Joe Biden. The absence of these 2020 Biden voters resulted in a worse performance for Democratic candidates in 2022.

The drop-off voters mattered but so, too, did voters who turned out in 2022 but not in earlier elections – and these voters also helped Republican candidates. Those voting in 2022 included 21% who had not voted in 2018. This group supported Republican candidates in 2022 by a margin of 58% to 40%.

National polling data, especially when based on interviews conducted over time with the same individuals, can shed light on these dynamics. But there are limitations with national data, given that midterms are state and local elections. Partisan defections and split-ticket voting were critically important to the success of individual candidates for U.S. Senate and governor. These defections tended to benefit Democratic candidates more often than Republican candidates, even when national turnout trends mostly benefited Republican candidates.

This study is based on surveys of members of the Center’s American Trends Panel following the last four general elections (2016-2022). Voter turnout in each election was verified by a comparison with official records.

Some of the analysis focuses on a subset of 7,041 panelists interviewed post-election in 2022 for whom reliable measures of voter turnout and candidate choice were also available for the 2018 and 2020 elections. This allowed us to analyze how individuals’ voting preferences changed over time, separating the political consequences of changes in party preferences from changes in who turned out in each election. (All analysis that considers individual-level changes in turnout or vote preference excludes the 2016 dataset, due to diminishing sample sizes among those who were in the panel across multiple elections.)
Other key findings from the study Voters under 30 continued to strongly support the Democratic Party, voting 68% to 31% for Democratic candidates. But this margin was somewhat narrower than in 2018. Republicans benefitted more from significant drop off in voter turnout among younger age groups between 2018 and 2022, since young voters tend to support Democrats. Voters under 30 accounted for 10% of the electorate in 2022 – similar to their share of all voters in 2018 (11%), but down from 2020 (14%). To learn more about voter demographics, such as age, race & ethnicity, religion and community type, refer to Chapter 3 of this report.
Ideological polarization by party was nearly complete in 2022: Only 1% of self-described conservative Republicans voted for Democratic House candidates and less than 1% of liberal Democrats voted Republican.
Voting in person on Election Day increased sharply in 2022 compared with 2020. More voters reported casting ballots in person on Election Day in both parties, but the share remained much higher among Republican voters (51%) than among Democratic voters (34%).
White voters without college degrees made up a majority (54%) of Republican voters in 2022, compared with 27% of Democratic voters. Yet these voters made up a somewhat greater share of GOP voters in 2020 (58%) and 2018 (57%).
Voters ages 50 and older were a larger share of the total in 2022 (64%) than in any of the past three elections. 70% of Republican voters were 50 or older, as were 57% of Democratic voters.
Hispanic voters continued to support Democrats, but by a much smaller margin than in 2018: Hispanic voters favored Democratic candidates by a 21-point margin in 2022, compared with a 47-point margin in 2018. This change was driven by asymmetric changes in voter turnout among Hispanic adults, rather than changing preferences among individual Hispanic voters.
Black voters continued to support Democrats by overwhelming margins: 93% voted for Democrats in the midterms while 5% supported Republicans. This is similar to levels of support in 2020, 2018 and 2016. Black voters made up 9% of the electorate in both 2022 and 2018 and 11% of the electorate in 2020.
The Republican advantage among White evangelical Protestants was somewhat larger in 2022 than in the past three elections. 86% supported Republican candidates in 2022 and only 12% voted Democratic. 

 

Rubén Weinsteiner

Life on Social Media Platforms, in Users’ Own Words

Rubén Weinsteiner

In focus groups, highly engaged social media users describe the purposes that different platforms serve for them, their choices about what to reveal and how they try to anticipate any hostile reactions that could be lurking

Behind each sweeping exploration of the role social media plays in society stand the unique stories of Americans and their online lives. People bring deeply personal needs to social media, and their experiences play out in deeply personalized ways, tied to the platforms and communities they are part of. These platforms can host nearly any imaginable human encounter or emotion, from powerful self-expression and deep connection to intense hostility and ruinous deceit.

To gain insight into people’s experiences and the platform environments that shape them, Pew Research Center conducted a series of five focus groups from July 11 to 13, 2022. They were designed to capture how the participants – all of whom were especially engaged on social media platforms – might navigate the complexities of their online worlds.

The discussions shed light on topics that are difficult to cover with surveys alone: How do people create the social media environment they hope to enjoy? What choices and calculations do they make about what to reveal, where to reveal it and who might be watching? How do the platforms that companies provide shape the experiences they have?

The views of these 23 U.S. adults – called “highly engaged users” throughout this report as shorthand – are not representative of all social media users or other populations. These individuals:

• Used multiple platforms frequently: They said they used at least three social media sites and apps, each at least a few times a week;
• Frequently shared things or commented when using social media: They said they frequently used social media to share things about themselves, share things other people have posted or comment on others’ content – either almost every time they used it or often;
• Found posting on social media important for self-expression: They said social media was extremely or very important to them in this way.

No single “social media experience” emerged from their stories – instead, participants’ accounts were nuanced and unique. Still, common themes arose from the group discussions, each connecting diverse experiences across platforms:  

Their stories highlight the ways navigating social media can both enrich and complicate people’s lives. Together, they form a detailed snapshot of what life on platforms looked like for these highly engaged users – grounded in the personal experiences of the people behind the screens and the platforms that shaped these experiences. (It should be noted that the groups took place before changes in Twitter’s ownership and as debates about TikTok were just heating up.)

This report describes findings from five live, online focus groups with a total of 23 U.S. adults, conducted from July 11 to 13, 2022. Pew Research Center worked with SSRS to conduct the groups, which were designed to capture the experiences of people who are especially engaged on social media platforms.

All of them were recruited from the SSRS Opinion Panel. To be eligible, they had to meet the following criteria making up the definition of a “highly engaged user” used in this report:

• Used multiple platforms frequently: They said they used at least three social media sites and apps, each at least a few times a week;
• Frequently shared things or commented when using social media: They said they frequently used social media to share things about themselves, share things other people have posted or comment on others’ content – either almost every time they used it or often;
• Found posting on social media important for self-expression: They said social media was extremely or very important to them in this way.

For more details on other eligibility criteria, recruitment and group composition, read the Methodology.

Center researchers developed a recruitment screener and discussion guide with assistance from SSRS, who partnered with InsideOut Insights (IOI) to conduct and moderate the groups.

While these groups are not representative of any broader population, participants were selected in order to achieve a mix of demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race and ethnicity, education, urbanicity and political party). Four groups were organized by either race and ethnicity or political party, while the other did not have additional demographic criteria. The discussion guide was the same for all groups.

Center researchers observed the focus groups and reviewed both the recordings and the transcripts from these groups to identify key themes and quotes. This report is meant to illustrate the variety of views and experiences of focus group participants, not the frequency with which these views and experiences came up. Views expressed by participants have not been fact-checked and are not representative of the overall experiences of any of these groups in the U.S. population. Quotations have been lightly edited for grammar and clarity.

Here are the key takeaways from the focus groups, featuring participants’ quotations (lightly edited for grammar and clarity) related to each of these themes.

What? Where? When? Using different platforms for different purposes

Our surveys have long shown that some people use a variety of online platforms – some of them very frequently – and that these are places for everything from staying in touch with loved ones to navigating contentious conversations. In the focus groups, two highly engaged users described how their use of platforms can make up the puzzle pieces of a highly customized online life.

“Twitter is more serious for me. Snapchat is a playground. We just get on there and post a bunch of goofy, great filters. … Then Facebook is more of a neighborhood or a village in a way. You can create your own set of, I guess, people that understand you. …  Instagram … is a picture book. … [Twitter is] politics and world events. I get a lot of news on my Twitter.”

– Woman, 20s

“Facebook is just mainly to just get in contact with my mom in Messenger. … YouTube is more entertainment. I also use it to learn more things because there’s just a bunch of information on YouTube, which you also have to be careful because a bunch of that is misinformation. And then TikTok is also mainly for entertainment for me. … For Instagram, it’s more friends and Facebook is more family.” 

– Woman, 30s

In the discussions, participants described how platforms served different purposes for them and helped them connect with different audiences. One participant described looking for specific things on TikTok, while another used it mostly to disconnect from life’s pressures; another turned to Twitter to follow politics; still others mentioned using platforms for entertainment or as a way to find solutions to problems they were dealing with.

Several highly engaged users described Facebook as a place to connect and interact with others, and one woman discussed how she uses different platforms for different groups of people in her life. A range of platforms came up throughout the discussions, including some beyond those the research initially set out to explore.

“Facebook, I use to connect with friends and family and to just keep them generally updated about what’s going on in my life. Then TikTok, I use for finding books, finding recipes, things that make me laugh. … Reddit, I use to post things and questions for people to give their opinion. … I use these platforms for different things.”

— Woman, 30s

A recurring high note for some participants in the focus groups related to finding community, support and connection on social media platforms. Two participants described ways that interactions on platforms both surprised them and added value to their lives – allowing them to connect with people both online and offline.

“I like Facebook because of the different groups that you can join. … And it lets you know that you’re not alone on whatever it is that you’re experiencing. You’re not on the earth by yourself. … It lets you know that even though you may be facing something, you may see it in a group or see it on a post that somebody else … overcame it and it lets you know that you can too.”

– Woman, 50s

“I put a post out on … both Nextdoor and Facebook, and I was shocked at the outpouring of help I got. People said, ‘Hey, you don’t live that far from me. I’m a notary. I’d actually be happy to stop by and help you.’ … It was nice. It was a real good experience with social media. It was nothing but positive.” 

– Man, 50s

One man described how TikTok helped him to feel less alone amid the pandemic; another used Nextdoor to tap into the local community. When it comes to keeping in touch with people who matter to them, one woman discussed how Facebook served as a way to find connection and maintain long-distance relationships. Another user, adding his experience on a streaming platform, described how connection could have both upsides and downsides.

“I think TikTok has an excellent algorithm that really quickly finds out what you want to see. You’ve got the ability to share with your friends and talk about it. And it’s really funny videos, really engaging, what you want to see. And it helped me really get through the pandemic. Helped me feel connected when we weren’t able to get out.”

— Man, 20s

How much of the ‘real me’? Navigating authenticity and self-expression 

These highly engaged users described vastly different approaches to self-expression on social media, ranging from full authenticity to being highly reserved to aspiring to present their best selves. Participants discussed how forthcoming they felt they could be on platforms, what they want people to take away from their social media presence and how this connects with their offline self.

Two participants highlighted the extremes of a continuum when it comes to how much their social media presence reflects who they are offline – from putting everything out there confidently to drawing a sharp distinction between the “real” self and the social media self.

“I truly feel I’m the same person on social media and when you meet me. I’m definitely one of those people who pride myself in that. … [I use] the same tone, the same attitude, the same emotions, everything is the same for me.”

— Woman, 30s

“I definitely don’t think anyone would ever know the real me from social media, like probably 25% [of] me.” 

— Man, 40s

Some participants said they like being an open book and “living out loud”; others were more reluctant or selective. One user described keeping things “vague,” while others talked about letting their personality shine through or spreading positivity. Especially in one group, several women described using social media platforms to call attention to injustice and stand firm to their views:

“I will repost things and post articles about injustices that I feel are going on or things that have happened to other people that they need boosted to get other people’s attention. … With social media, I have the opportunity to live out loud. … I don’t feel the need to limit myself when I post on social media. If I’m going to do it, I’m going to do it everywhere.” 

— Woman, 30s

 Who’s out there? Tailoring social media posts to different audiences in different places

For some participants in the focus groups – all of whom used multiple platforms frequently – their decisions about what to reveal and how much to share were tied to specific platforms and who would see what they posted on each. Some saw certain places as more suitable than others for some types of content, and made their decisions about what to post accordingly – for example, using multiple platforms to control who saw what. Still others said they only share things in places they feel are more private.

“I think on social media it’s more curated. I show what I want people to see. I mean, depends on what social media. Like Facebook, it’s very like prim and proper … [on] Instagram … I can go more into my political views, my social views and things like that.”

— Woman, 20s

“I use Instagram versus Facebook to separate friends and family. [I put] stuff I don’t want my family to see on Instagram and stuff I don’t want my friends to see on Facebook. And then my getaway from it all would be YouTube just [to] learn about random stuff.”

— Man, 20s

“I like privacy. … I don’t post a lot of things that I don’t want people to know. And I feel like I just want to share that with my family. That’s why I created a special group with them.”

— Woman, 20s

In deciding where to post, several participants described their calculations about how “public” certain platforms seem – even as the platforms offer a variety of privacy settings – and took note of who might follow them on each site. For example, one man in his 20s described feeling more cautious about Facebook, where “everybody’s watching,” while Instagram allowed him to take advantage of the fact that he could share things with less permanence.

“Facebook feels a lot more public. You got to be a bit more careful about what you say. On Instagram, I feel like I can post any stupid take that I have to my story. And it’ll be gone in 24 hours and only people who I’ve allowed to follow me will see it. Whereas with Facebook, I feel like everybody’s watching.”

– Man, 20s

Exposed and at risk: Anticipating possible attacks

In recent years, our survey research has explored why some people are reluctant to post on social media about political and social issues, how the public views cancel culture, and whether people think viewpoints are censored on social media.

The focus groups provided insight into risk calculations people might make as they navigate contentious environments, as well as the broader consequences users thought could arise from posting in a relatively public forum. Participants’ worries included concerns around being “screenshotted”; feeling like they have a target on their back; fearing for their reputation; and wondering if what they say might get them banned from a platform. Some of them described these concerns in response to questions about posting political views specifically:

“I don’t [share about political or social issues] online. If I do anything online, it would be … a thumbs up or a dislike, and that’s it. I would just keep it at that, because posting something would just turn into an argument, and I just don’t have the time and energy to continue, because it’s a losing battle anyway.” 

— Man, 40s

“People screenshot [things others say]. And take the private [conversation] out of private and make it public. It’s not safe [to express political views].”

— Woman, 20s

“[I think that] Facebook … [has] gotten so much worse with [banning you or locking your page]. … They will remove your post before they even let you know that you’ve made a mistake. And then they won’t even halfway give you a chance to kind of plead your case.”

— Woman, 30s

One woman discussed being verbally attacked on Facebook, while another described how the Nextdoor communities she was a part of differed based on where they were. Other participants talked about seeing some platforms as particularly combative, or the repercussions they might face in terms of their reputation or from the platforms. Some also talked about the possibility of being monitored or that social media posts could be used against them.  

“My husband and I, and my son, had COVID maybe a year and a half ago. … At the time I wasn’t vaccinated. So, I went and got vaccinated. We all went together, and I put it on Facebook, not knowing I was going to be attacked for it. I’m telling you that a guy came, attacked me, said I’m stupid, I’m an idiot and all kind of stuff. It hurt my feelings, I almost cried. I’m like, ‘How could somebody be so mean?’” 

– Woman, 40s

Listen, CEO: Changing social media
for the better

To close out the focus groups, participants were asked how they would want those who run social media companies to troubleshoot some of the problems they see: If a CEO of a social media company you use were sitting with us right now, what would you tell them to change to make their platform better for you and the people you know?

Some responses covered issues from what speech is allowed on the platforms to prioritizing user wellness and protecting younger users.

“I would say [to Facebook’s CEO and others, I want] … a stronger stance combating authoritarian views and support.”

– Man, 50s

“Give me a time limit. … Once I reach my time limit, lock me out.” 

– Woman, 50s

“I would say everyone who is on social media needs to [meet] an age requirement.”

– Woman, 30s

Other users provided different takes on these themes – some to particular CEOs while others for social media platforms broadly:

“I’m thinking of Facebook: If it’s going to be run by one type [or] group of people, then say that, but don’t [be] underhanded, backhanded, push an agenda, and then mute comments that differ.”

– Woman, 40s

 

Rubén Weinsteiner

How MARCA POLITICA Center will report on generations moving forward

 

Rubén Weinsteiner

Journalists, researchers and the public often look at society through the lens of generation, using terms like Millennial or Gen Z to describe groups of similarly aged people. This approach can help readers see themselves in the data and assess where we are and where we’re headed as a country.
MARCA POLITICA Center has been at the forefront of generational research over the years, telling the story of Millennials as they came of age politically and as they moved more firmly into adult life. In recent years, we’ve also been eager to learn about Gen Z as the leading edge of this generation moves into adulthood.
But generational research has become a crowded arena. The field has been flooded with content that’s often sold as research but is more like clickbait or marketing mythology. There’s also been a growing chorus of criticism about generational research and generational labels in particular.
Recently, as we were preparing to embark on a major research project related to Gen Z, we decided to take a step back and consider how we can study generations in a way that aligns with our values of accuracy, rigor and providing a foundation of facts that enriches the public dialogue.
A typical generation spans 15 to 18 years. As many critics of generational research point out, there is great diversity of thought, experience and behavior within generations.
We set out on a yearlong process of assessing the landscape of generational research. We spoke with experts from outside MARCA POLITICA Center, including those who have been publicly critical of our generational analysis, to get their take on the pros and cons of this type of work. We invested in methodological testing to determine whether we could compare findings from our earlier telephone surveys to the online ones we’re conducting now. And we experimented with higher-level statistical analyses that would allow us to isolate the effect of generation.
What emerged from this process was a set of clear guidelines that will help frame our approach going forward. Many of these are principles we’ve always adhered to, but others will require us to change the way we’ve been doing things in recent years.
Here’s a short overview of how we’ll approach generational research in the future:
We’ll only do generational analysis when we have historical data that allows us to compare generations at similar stages of life. When comparing generations, it’s crucial to control for age. In other words, researchers need to look at each generation or age cohort at a similar point in the life cycle. (“Age cohort” is a fancy way of referring to a group of people who were born around the same time.)
When doing this kind of research, the question isn’t whether young adults today are different from middle-aged or older adults today. The question is whether young adults today are different from young adults at some specific point in the past.
To answer this question, it’s necessary to have data that’s been collected over a considerable amount of time – think decades. Standard surveys don’t allow for this type of analysis. We can look at differences across age groups, but we can’t compare age groups over time.
Another complication is that the surveys we conducted 20 or 30 years ago aren’t usually comparable enough to the surveys we’re doing today. Our earlier surveys were done over the phone, and we’ve since transitioned to our nationally representative online survey panel, the American Trends Panel. Our internal testing showed that on many topics, respondents answer questions differently depending on the way they’re being interviewed. So we can’t use most of our surveys from the late 1980s and early 2000s to compare Gen Z with Millennials and Gen Xers at a similar stage of life.
This means that most generational analysis we do will use datasets that have employed similar methodologies over a long period of time, such as surveys from the U.S. Census Bureau. A good example is our 2020 report on Millennial families, which used census data going back to the late 1960s. The report showed that Millennials are marrying and forming families at a much different pace than the generations that came before them.
Even when we have historical data, we will attempt to control for other factors beyond age in making generational comparisons. If we accept that there are real differences across generations, we’re basically saying that people who were born around the same time share certain attitudes or beliefs – and that their views have been influenced by external forces that uniquely shaped them during their formative years. Those forces may have been social changes, economic circumstances, technological advances or political movements.
When we see that younger adults have different views than their older counterparts, it may be driven by their demographic traits rather than the fact that they belong to a particular generation.
The tricky part is isolating those forces from events or circumstances that have affected all age groups, not just one generation. These are often called “period effects.” An example of a period effect is the Watergate scandal, which drove down trust in government among all age groups. Differences in trust across age groups in the wake of Watergate shouldn’t be attributed to the outsize impact that event had on one age group or another, because the change occurred across the board.
Changing demographics also may play a role in patterns that might at first seem like generational differences. We know that the United States has become more racially and ethnically diverse in recent decades, and that race and ethnicity are linked with certain key social and political views. When we see that younger adults have different views than their older counterparts, it may be driven by their demographic traits rather than the fact that they belong to a particular generation.
Controlling for these factors can involve complicated statistical analysis that helps determine whether the differences we see across age groups are indeed due to generation or not. This additional step adds rigor to the process. Unfortunately, it’s often absent from current discussions about Gen Z, Millennials and other generations.
When we can’t do generational analysis, we still see value in looking at differences by age and will do so where it makes sense. Age is one of the most common predictors of differences in attitudes and behaviors. And even if age gaps aren’t rooted in generational differences, they can still be illuminating. They help us understand how people across the age spectrum are responding to key trends, technological breakthroughs and historical events.
Each stage of life comes with a unique set of experiences. Young adults are often at the leading edge of changing attitudes on emerging social trends. Take views on same-sex marriage, for example, or attitudes about gender identity.
Many middle-aged adults, in turn, face the challenge of raising children while also providing care and support to their aging parents. And older adults have their own obstacles and opportunities. All of these stories – rooted in the life cycle, not in generations – are important and compelling, and we can tell them by analyzing our surveys at any given point in time.
When we do have the data to study groups of similarly aged people over time, we won’t always default to using the standard generational definitions and labels. While generational labels are simple and catchy, there are other ways to analyze age cohorts. For example, some observers have suggested grouping people by the decade in which they were born. This would create narrower cohorts in which the members may share more in common. People could also be grouped relative to their age during key historical events (such as the Great Recession or the COVID-19 pandemic) or technological innovations (like the invention of the iPhone).
By choosing not to use the standard generational labels when they’re not appropriate, we can avoid reinforcing harmful stereotypes or oversimplifying people’s complex lived experiences.
Existing generational definitions also may be too broad and arbitrary to capture differences that exist among narrower cohorts. A typical generation spans 15 to 18 years. As many critics of generational research point out, there is great diversity of thought, experience and behavior within generations. The key is to pick a lens that’s most appropriate for the research question that’s being studied. If we’re looking at political views and how they’ve shifted over time, for example, we might group people together according to the first presidential election in which they were eligible to vote.
By choosing not to use the standard generational labels when they’re not appropriate, we can avoid reinforcing harmful stereotypes or oversimplifying people’s complex lived experiences.
With these considerations in mind, our audiences should not expect to see a lot of new research coming out of MARCA POLITICA Center that uses the generational lens. We’ll only talk about generations when it adds value, advances important national debates and highlights meaningful societal trends.

Rubén Weinsteiner

How Public Polling Has Changed in the 21st Century

Rubén Weinsteiner

61% of national pollsters in the U.S. used methods in 2022 that differed from those of 2016

The 2016 and 2020 presidential elections left many Americans wondering whether polling was broken and what, if anything, pollsters might do about it. A new Pew Research Center study finds that most national pollsters have changed their approach since 2016, and in some cases dramatically. Most (61%) of the pollsters who conducted and publicly released national surveys in both 2016 and 2022 used methods in 2022 that differed from what they used in 2016. The study also finds the use of multiple methods increasing. Last year 17% of national pollsters used at least three different methods to sample or interview people (sometimes in the same survey), up from 2% in 2016.

This study captures what changes were made and approximately when. While it does not capture why the changes were made, public commentary by pollsters suggests a mix of factors – with some adjusting their methods in response to the profession’s recent election-related errors and others reacting to separate industry trends. The cost and feasibility of various methods are likely to have influenced decisions.

This study represents a new effort to measure the nature and degree of change in how national public polls are conducted. Rather than leaning on anecdotal accounts, the study tracked the methods used by 78 organizations that sponsor national polls and publicly release the results. The organizations analyzed represent or collaborated with nearly all the country’s best-known national pollsters. In this study, “national poll” refers to a survey reporting on the views of U.S. adults, registered voters or likely voters. It is not restricted to election vote choice (or “horserace”) polling, as the public opinion field is much broader. The analysis stretches back to 2000, making it possible to distinguish between trends emerging before 2016 (e.g., migration to online methods) and those emerging more recently (e.g., reaching respondents by text message). Study details are provided in the Methodology. Other key findings from the study include:

Pollsters made more design changes after 2020 than 2016. In the wake of the 2016 presidential election, it was unclear if the polling errors were an anomaly or the start of a longer-lasting problem. 2020 provided an answer, as most polls understated GOP support a second time. The study found that after 2020, more than a third of pollsters (37%) changed how they sample people, how they interview them, or both. This compares with about a quarter (26%) who made changes after 2016. As noted above, though, these changes did not necessarily occur because of concerns about election-related errors.

The number of national pollsters relying exclusively on live phone is declining rapidly. Telephone polling with live interviewers dominated the industry in the early 2000s, even as pollsters scrambled to adapt to the rapid growth of cellphone-only households. Since 2012, however, its use has fallen amid declining response rates and increasing costs. Today live phone is not completely dead, but pollsters who use it tend to use other methods as well. Last year 10% of the pollsters examined in the study used live phone as their only method of national public polling, but 32% used live phone alone or in combination with other methods. In some cases, the other methods were used alongside live phone in a single poll, and in other cases the pollster did one poll using live phone and other polls with a different method.

Several key trends, such as growth of online polling, were well underway prior to 2016. While the 2016 and 2020 elections were consequential events for polling, the study illustrates how some of the methodological churn in recent years reflects longer-term trends. For example, the growth of online methods was well underway before 2016. Similarly, some live phone pollsters had already started to sample from registered voter files (instead of RDD, random-digit dialing) prior to 2016.

Use of probability-based panels has become more prevalent. A growing number of pollsters have turned to sampling from a list of residential addresses from the U.S. Postal Service database to draw a random sample of Americans, a method known as address-based sampling (ABS). There are two main types of surveys that do this: one-off or standalone polls and polls using survey panels recruited using ABS or telephone (known as probability-based panels). Both are experiencing growth. The number of national pollsters using probability-based panels alone or in combination with other methods tripled from 2016 to 2022 (from seven to 23). The number of national pollsters conducting one-off ABS surveys alone or in combination with other methods during that time rose as well (from one in 2016 to seven in 2022).

The growth of online opt-in among national pollsters appears to have paused after 2020. The number of national pollsters using convenience samples of people online (“opt-in sampling”) – whether alone or in combination with other methods – more than quadrupled between 2012 and 2020 (from 10 to 47). In 2022, however, this number held flat, suggesting that the era of explosive growth could be ending.

Whether changes to sample sources and modes translate into greater accuracy in presidential elections remains to be seen. The fact that pollsters are expanding into new and different methods is not a guarantee that the underrepresentation of GOP support occurring in 2016 and 2020 preelection polls has been fixed. Polling accuracy improved in 2022, but this represents only one nonpresidential election. 

Notable study limitations

A study of this nature requires difficult decisions about what exactly will be measured and what will not. This study focuses on two key poll features: the sample source(s) – that is, where the respondents came from – and the mode(s), or how they were interviewed. While important, these elements are not exhaustive of the decisions required in designing a poll. The study did not attempt to track other details, such as weighting, where public documentation is often missing. Because the study only measured two out of all possible poll features, estimates from this study likely represent a lower bound of the total amount of change in the polling industry.

Another limitation worth highlighting is the fact that state-level polls are not included. Unfortunately, attempting to find, document and code polling from all 50 states and the District of Columbia would have exceeded the time and staff resources available. A related consideration is that disclosure of methods information tends to be spottier for pollsters who exclusively work at the state level, though there are some exceptions. It is not clear whether analysis at the level of detail presented in this report would be possible for state-only pollsters.

While not necessarily a limitation, the decision to use the polling organization rather than individual polls as the unit of analysis has implications for the findings. The proliferation of organizations using online methods implies but does not prove that online polls grew as well. However, research conducted by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) following the 2016 and 2020 elections reveals an explosion in the share of all polling done using online methods. AAPOR estimated that 56% of national polls conducted shortly before the 2016 election used online methods; the comparable share for 2020 was 84%. More details on the strengths and weaknesses of the study are presented in the Methodology.

Changes in methods are driven by many considerations, including costs and quality

In an attempt to verify the accuracy of the categorization of polling methodologies, researchers attempted to contact all organizations represented in the database. Several pollsters contacted for this study noted that use of a particular method was not necessarily an endorsement of methodological quality or superiority. Instead, design decisions often reflect a multitude of factors. Survey cost – especially the increasing cost of live phone polling – came up repeatedly. Timing can also be a factor, as a design like address-based sampling can take weeks or even months to field. As noted above, this study does not attempt to address why each organization polled the way they did. It aims only to describe major changes observable within the polling industry. Nor does it evaluate the quality of different methods, as a multitude of other studies address that question.

Changes to polling after 2020 differed from those after 2016

The study found a different kind of change within the polling industry after 2020 versus 2016. After 2020, changes were both more common and more complex. More than a third (37%) of pollsters releasing national public polls in both 2020 and 2022 changed their methods during that interval. By contrast, the share changing their methods between 2016 and 2018 was 26%.

The nature of the changes also differed. About half of the changes observed from 2016 to 2018 reflected pollsters going online – either by adding online interviewing as one of their methods or fully replacing live phone interviewing. By contrast, the changes observed from 2020 to 2022 were more of a mix. During that period, some added an approach like text messaging (e.g., Change Research, Data for Progress), probability-based panels (Politico, USA Today) or multiple new methods (CNN, Wall Street Journal). About a quarter of the change observed from 2020 to 2022 reflected pollsters who had already moved online dropping live phone as one of their tools (e.g., CBS News, Pew Research Center).

A look at change over the entire recent period – from 2016 to 2022 – finds that more than half of national public pollsters (61%) used methods in 2022 that differed from those they used in 2016. As noted above, if features like weighting protocols were included in the analysis, that rate would be even higher.

A longer view of modern public polling (going back to 2000) shows that methodological churn began in earnest around 2012 to 2014. That was a period when about a third of national pollsters changed their methods. Change during that period was marked by pollsters starting to migrate away from live telephone surveys and toward online surveys.

Pollsters increasingly use multiple methods – sometimes three or more

Pollsters are not just using different methods, many are now using multiple methods, the study found. Here again there is a discernable difference in how polls changed after 2016 and how they changed after 2020. After 2016, the share of pollsters using multiple methods remained virtually unchanged (30% in both 2016 and 2018). After 2020, however, the share climbed to 39%. Notably, the share of pollsters using three or more different methodologies in their national public polls tripled from 5% in 2020 to 17% in 2022.

In this analysis, “multiple methods” refers to use of multiple sample sources (e.g., registered voter files and random-digit dial) or multiple interview modes (e.g., online, mail, live telephone). In some cases, several methods were used in a single poll. In other cases the pollster did one poll using one method and another poll using another method.

As an example, in 2014 Pew Research Center switched from exclusively using live phone with random-digit-dial sample to also using a probability-based panel. In 2020 the Center added an additional method, one-off address-based sample surveys offering online or mail response. By 2022, the Center dropped live phone polling. Pollsters that used at least three different methods in 2022 include CNN, Gallup, NPR, Politico and USA Today.

Text messaging and address-recruited panels see growth after 2020

An overarching theme in the study is the growth of new methods. Analysis earlier in this report aimed to describe trends for the most prominent methods. In the past, pollsters often used just one method (e.g., live phone with random-digit dial). That has changed. Today pollsters tend to use new methods (such as text) as one of several ways that they reach people. To track the trajectory of these newer methods, it helps to consider the number of pollsters using the method by itself or in combination with other methods.

A prime example is text message polling. An extremely small share of pollsters conduct national public polls exclusively by text. A larger share use text alongside another method, such as online opt-in.

How texting is used varies. In some cases respondents receive a text with a web link for an online survey. In other cases, respondents answer the questions via text. Among the pollsters in this study, just one used texting in a national public survey in 2020. In 2022 that number rose to nine, representing 13% of the active national pollsters tracked that year. These figures reflect the number of pollsters using texting alone or in combination with other methods like live phone.

Analysis looking at methods used either alone or in combination with other approaches also suggests a change in the trajectory of online opt-in polling. While online opt-in usage grew tremendously between 2006 and 2020, that growth appears to have slowed if not stopped in 2022 for national polling.

By contrast, the share of national pollsters turning to probability-based panels continues to grow. In 2022 a third (33%) of national pollsters used probability-based panels either alone or in combination with other methods. This is up from roughly 10% during most of the 2010s.

Live phone was once the dominant method of polling but has been in decline since 2016. As of 2022, about a third of national pollsters used live phone alone or in combination (32%), while a much smaller share relied on it as their only method (10%).

The study also tracked the adoption of a specific kind of opt-in sample – members of an online opt-in panel who are matched to a record in a national registered voter file. This study first observed that approach in 2018. In 2018, 2020 and 2022, about 3% to 5% of national public pollsters used online opt-in samples matched to registered voter files, the study found.

Rubén Weinsteiner

Youth Vote: Large shares in many countries are pessimistic about the next generation’s financial future

 Rubén Weinsteiner

When asked how children in their country will fare financially when they grow up, a median of 70% of adults across 19 countries say they will be worse off than their parents, according to a MARCA POLITICA Center survey conducted this spring.




MARCA POLITICA Center analysis focuses on the financial futures of the next generation in 19 countries, including the United States. For non-U.S. data, this post draws on nationally representative surveys of 20,944 adults from Feb. 14 to June 3, 2022. All surveys were conducted over the phone with adults in Canada, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. Surveys were conducted face to face in Hungary, Poland and Israel and online in Australia.

In the U.S., we surveyed 3,581 adults from March 21 to 27, 2022. Everyone who took part in the U.S. survey is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories.

Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses. Visit our methodology database for more information about the survey methods outside the U.S. For respondents in the U.S., read more about the ATP’s methodology.

At least three-quarters of adults in Japan, France, Italy and Canada say children will be worse off financially than their parents, as do majorities in Spain, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and South Korea. Singapore is the lone country surveyed where a majority of adults (56%) believe the next generation will be better off financially.

In Israel, Hungary and Poland – where the surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews – more than one-in-ten volunteered a response of “same,” meaning they believe children will have about the same financial situation as their parents. Still, Hungarians are more pessimistic than optimistic about the financial future of children in their country, while Israelis are more optimistic and Poles are almost evenly split.

In nine of the countries surveyed, the percentage of people who say children are going to be worse off than their parents has increased significantly since the question was last asked. For example, 42% of respondents in Poland say the youngest generation will be worse off financially – nearly double the 23% who said so in 2019.

The proportion of people with a pessimistic view of children’s financial future is up by 14 percentage points in Australia, 12 points in the Netherlands and 11 points in Hungary since the last time the question was asked in each country. Smaller but still significant increases in these views occurred in the UK, Canada, Singapore, Japan and the U.S.

In 11 of the countries surveyed this year, a record or near record high percentage of adults say children will be worse off financially than their parents. In South Korea, for example, there has been a steady increase since the question was first asked in 2013 in the share of adults who say children will be worse off than their parents.

In other countries, however, the share of adults who see a worse financial future for children is lower than in previous years. In France, for example, 90% of adults said in 2013 – during the eurozone public debt crisis which resulted in a French recession – that children would be financially worse off than their parents.

In all 19 countries surveyed, people with a negative view of their country’s current economic conditions are far more likely to believe that children in their country will be worse off in the future. In Poland, for example, 63% of those with a negative view of the country’s current economic situation believe children will be worse off in the future. Among Polish adults who see the country’s current economic situation as good, by contrast, only 19% share this view. Even in Japan, where the difference is the smallest of 19 countries, the gap stands at 17 points.

Even among those with a positive view of their country’s current economy, however, many are pessimistic about the financial prospects of the next generation. In 10 countries – the U.S., Italy, the UK, Spain, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, France, Belgium and Japan – around half or more of adults with a positive view of the economy nevertheless expect children to be worse off than their parents.

Rubén Weinsteiner

Teens, Social Media and Technology 2022

Rubén Weinsteiner
 

 

TikTok has established itself as one of the top online platforms for U.S. teens, while the share of teens who use Facebook has fallen sharply



How we did this

The landscape of social media is ever-changing, especially among teens who often are on the leading edge of this space. A new MARCA POLITICA survey of American teenagers ages 13 to 17 finds TikTok has rocketed in popularity since its North American debut several years ago and now is a top social media platform for teens among the platforms covered in this survey. Some 67% of teens say they ever use TikTok, with 16% of all teens saying they use it almost constantly. Meanwhile, the share of teens who say they use Facebook, a dominant social media platform among teens in the Center’s 2014-15 survey, has plummeted from 71% then to 32% today.

YouTube tops the 2022 teen online landscape among the platforms covered in the Center’s new survey, as it is used by 95% of teens. TikTok is next on the list of platforms that were asked about in this survey (67%), followed by Instagram and Snapchat, which are both used by about six-in-ten teens. After those platforms come Facebook with 32% and smaller shares who use Twitter, Twitch, WhatsApp, Reddit and Tumblr.1

Changes in the social media landscape since 2014-15 extend beyond TikTok’s rise and Facebook’s fall. Growing shares of teens say they are using Instagram and Snapchat since then. Conversely, Twitter and Tumblr saw declining shares of teens who report using their platforms. And two of the platforms the Center tracked in the earlier survey – Vine and Google+ – no longer exist.

There are some notable demographic differences in teens’ social media choices. For example, teen boys are more likely than teen girls to say they use YouTube, Twitch and Reddit, whereas teen girls are more likely than teen boys to use TikTok, Instagram and Snapchat. In addition, higher shares of Black and Hispanic teens report using TikTok, Instagram, Twitter and WhatsApp compared with White teens.2

This study also explores the frequency with which teens are on each of the top five online platforms: YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, Snapchat and Facebook. Fully 35% of teens say they are using at least one of them “almost constantly.” Teen TikTok and Snapchat users are particularly engaged with these platforms, followed by teen YouTube users in close pursuit. A quarter of teens who use Snapchat or TikTok say they use these apps almost constantly, and a fifth of teen YouTube users say the same. When looking at teens overall, 19% say they use YouTube almost constantly, 16% say this about TikTok, and 15% about Snapchat.

When reflecting on the amount of time they spend on social media generally, a majority of U.S. teens (55%) say they spend about the right amount of time on these apps and sites, while about a third of teens (36%) say they spend too much time on social media. Just 8% of teens think they spend too little time on these platforms.

Asked about the idea of giving up social media, 54% of teens say it would be at least somewhat hard to give it up, while 46% say it would be at least somewhat easy. Teen girls are more likely than teen boys to express it would be difficult to give up social media (58% vs. 49%). Conversely, a quarter of teen boys say giving up social media would be very easy, while 15% of teen girls say the same. Older teens also say they would have difficulty giving up social media. About six-in-ten teens ages 15 to 17 (58%) say giving up social media would be at least somewhat difficult to do. A smaller share of 13- to 14-year-olds (48%) think this would be difficult.

Beyond just online platforms, the new survey finds that the vast majority of teens have access to digital devices, such as smartphones (95%), desktop or laptop computers (90%) and gaming consoles (80%). And the study shows there has been an uptick in daily teen internet users, from 92% in 2014-15 to 97% today. In addition, the share of teens who say they are online almost constantly has roughly doubled since 2014-15 (46% now and 24% then).

These are some of the findings from an online survey of 1,316 teens conducted by the Pew Research Center from April 14 to May 4, 2022. More details about the findings on adoption and use of digital technologies by teens are covered below.
Smartphones, desktop and laptop computers, and gaming consoles remain widely accessible to teens

Since 2014-15, there has been a 22 percentage point rise in the share of teens who report having access to a smartphone (95% now and 73% then). While teens’ access to smartphones has increased over roughly the past eight years, their access to other digital technologies, such as desktop or laptop computers or gaming consoles, has remained statistically unchanged.

The survey shows there are differences in access to these digital devices for certain groups. For instance, teens ages 15 to 17 (98%) are more likely to have access to a smartphone than their 13- to 14-year-old counterparts (91%). In addition, teen boys are 21 points more likely to say they have access to gaming consoles than teen girls – a pattern that has been reported in prior Center research.3

Access to computers and gaming consoles also differs by teens’ household income. U.S. teens living in households that make $75,000 or more annually are 12 points more likely to have access to gaming consoles and 15 points more likely to have access to a desktop or laptop computer than teens from households with incomes under $30,000. These gaps in teen computer and gaming console access are consistent with digital divides by household income the Center has observed in previous teen surveys.

While 72% of U.S. teens say they have access to a smartphone, a computer and a gaming console at home, more affluent teens are particularly likely to have access to all three devices. Fully 76% of teens that live in households that make at least $75,000 a year say they have or have access to a smartphone, a gaming console and a desktop or laptop computer, compared with smaller shares of teens from households that make less than $30,000 or teens from households making $30,000 to $74,999 a year who say they have access to all three (60% and 69% of teens, respectively).
Almost all U.S. teens report using the internet daily

The share of teens who say they use the internet about once a day or more has grown slightly since 2014-15. Today, 97% of teens say they use the internet daily, compared with 92% of teens in 2014-15 who said the same.

In addition, the share of teens who say they use the internet almost constantly has gone up: 46% of teens say they use the internet almost constantly, up from only about a quarter (24%) of teenagers who said the same in 2014-15.

Black and Hispanic teens stand out for being on the internet more frequently than White teens. Some 56% of Black teens and 55% of Hispanic teens say they are online almost constantly, compared with 37% of White teens. The difference between Hispanic and White teens on this measure is consistent with previous findings when it comes to frequent internet use.

In addition, older teens are more likely to be online almost constantly. Some 52% of 15- to 17-year-olds say they use the internet almost constantly, while 36% of 13- to 14-year-olds say the same. Another demographic pattern in “almost constant” internet use: 53% of urban teens report being online almost constantly, while somewhat smaller shares of suburban and rural teens say the same (44% and 43%, respectively).

Slight differences are seen among those who say they engage in “almost constant” internet use based on household income. A slightly larger share of teens from households making $30,000 to $74,999 annually report using the internet almost constantly, compared with teens from homes making at least $75,000 (51% and 43%, respectively). Teens who live in households making under $30,000 do not significantly differ from either group.
The social media landscape has shifted

This survey asked whether U.S. teens use 10 specific online platforms: YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, Snapchat, Facebook, Twitter, Twitch, WhatsApp, Reddit and Tumblr.

YouTube stands out as the most common online platform teens use out of the platforms measured, with 95% saying they ever use this site or app. Majorities also say they use TikTok (67%), Instagram (62%) and Snapchat (59%). Instagram and Snapchat use has grown since asked about in 2014-15, when roughly half of teens said they used Instagram (52%) and about four-in-ten said they used Snapchat (41%).

The share of teens using Facebook has declined sharply in the past decade. Today, 32% of teens report ever using Facebook, down 39 points since 2014-15, when 71% said they ever used the platform. Although today’s teens do not use Facebook as extensively as teens in previous years, the platform still enjoys widespread usage among adults, as seen in other recent Center studies.

Other social media platforms have also seen decreases in usage among teens since 2014-15. Some 23% of teens now say they ever use Twitter, compared with 33% in 2014-15. Tumblr has seen a similar decline. While 14% of teens in 2014-15 reported using Tumblr, just 5% of teens today say they use this platform.

The online platforms teens flock to differ slightly based on gender. Teen girls are more likely than teen boys to say they ever use TikTok, Instagram and Snapchat, while boys are more likely to use Twitch and Reddit. Boys also report using YouTube at higher rates than girls, although the vast majority of teens use this platform regardless of gender.

Teens’ use of certain online platforms also differs by race and ethnicity. Black and Hispanic teens are more likely than White teens to say they ever use TikTok, Instagram, Twitter or WhatsApp. Black teens also stand out for being more likely to use TikTok compared with Hispanic teens, while Hispanic teens are more likely than their peers to use WhatsApp.

Older teens are more likely than younger teens to say they use each of the online platforms asked about except for YouTube and WhatsApp. Instagram is an especially notable example, with a majority of teens ages 15 to 17 (73%) saying they ever use Instagram, compared with 45% of teens ages 13 to 14 who say the same (a 28-point gap).

Despite Facebook losing its dominance in the social media world with this new cohort of teens, higher shares of those living in lower- and middle-income households gravitate toward Facebook than their peers who live in more affluent households: 44% of teens living in households earning less than $30,000 a year and 39% of teens from households earning $30,000 to less than $75,000 a year say they ever use Facebook, while 27% of those from households earning $75,000 or more a year say the same. Differences in Facebook use by household income were found in previous Center surveys as well (however the differences by household income were more pronounced in the past).

When it comes to the frequency that teens use the top five platforms the survey looked at, YouTube and TikTok stand out as the platforms teens use most frequently. About three-quarters of teens visit YouTube at least daily, including 19% who report using the site or app almost constantly. A majority of teens (58%) visit TikTok daily, while about half say the same for Snapchat (51%) and Instagram (50%).

Looking within teens who use a given platform, TikTok and Snapchat stand out for having larger shares of teenage users who visit these platforms regularly. Fully 86% of teen TikTok or Snapchat users say they are on that platform daily and a quarter of teen users for both of these platforms say they are on the site or app almost constantly. Somewhat smaller shares of teen YouTube users (20%) and teen Instagram users (16%) say they are on those respective platforms almost constantly (about eight-in-ten teen users are on these platforms daily).

Not only is there a smaller share of teenage Facebook users than there was in 2014-15, teens who do use Facebook are also relatively less frequent users of the platform compared with the other platforms covered in this survey. Just 7% of teen Facebook users say they are on the site or app almost constantly (representing 2% of all teens). Still, about six-in-ten teen Facebook users (57%) visit the platform daily.

Across these five platforms, 35% of all U.S. teens say they are on at least one of them almost constantly. While this is not a comprehensive rundown of all teens who use any kind of online platform almost constantly, this 35% of teens represent a group of relatively heavy platform users and they clearly have different views about their use of social media compared with those who say they use at least one of these platforms, though less often than “almost constantly.” Those findings are covered in a later section.

Larger shares of Black and Hispanic teens say they are on TikTok, YouTube and Instagram almost constantly than White teens. For example, Black and Hispanic teens are roughly five times more likely than White teens to say they are on Instagram almost constantly.

Hispanic teens are more likely to be frequent users of Snapchat than White or Black teens: 23% of Hispanic teens say they use this social media platform almost constantly, while 12% of White teens and 11% of Black teens say the same. There are no racial and ethnic differences in teens’ frequency of Facebook usage.

Overall, Hispanic (47%) and Black teens (45%) are more likely than White teens (26%) to say they use at least one of these five online platforms almost constantly.
Slight majorities of teens see the amount of time they spend on social media as about right and say it would be hard to give up

As social media use has become a common part of many teens’ daily routine, the Center asked U.S. teens how they feel about the amount of time they are spending on social media. A slight majority (55%) say the amount of time they spend of social media is about right, and smaller shares say they spend too much time or too little time on these platforms.

While a majority of teen boys and half of teen girls say they spend about the right amount of time on social media, this sentiment is more common among boys. Teen girls are more likely than their male counterparts to say they spend too much time on social media. In addition, White teens are more likely to see their time using social media as about right compared with Hispanic teens. Black teens do not differ from either group.

This analysis also explored how teens who frequently use these platforms may feel about their time on them and how those feelings may differ from teens who use these sites and apps less frequently. To do this, two groups were constructed. The first group is the 35% of teens who say they use at least one of the five platforms this survey covered – YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, Snapchat or Facebook – almost constantly. The other group consists of teens who say they use these platforms but not as frequently – that is, they use at least one of these five platforms but use them less often than “almost constantly.”

When asked how they feel about the time they spend on social media, 53% of teens who almost constantly use at least one of the platforms say they are on social media too much, while about three-in-ten teens (28%) who use at least one of these platforms but less often say the same.

Teens who are almost constantly online – not just on social media – also stand out for saying they spend too much time on social media: 51% say they are on social media too much. By comparison, 26% of teens who are online several times a day say they are on social media too much.

When reflecting on what it would be like to try to quit social media, teens are somewhat divided whether this would be easy or difficult. Some 54% of U.S. teens say it would be very (18%) or somewhat hard (35%) for them to give up social media. Conversely, 46% of teens say it would be at least somewhat easy for them to give up social media, with a fifth saying it would be very easy.

Teenage girls are slightly more likely to say it would be hard to give up social media than teen boys (58% vs. 49%). A similar gap is seen between older and younger teens, with teens 15 to 17 years old being more likely than 13- and 14-year-olds to say it would be at least somewhat hard to give up social media.

A majority of teens who use at least one of the platforms asked about in the survey “almost constantly” say it would be hard to give up social media, with 32% saying it would be very hard. Smaller shares of teens who use at least one of these online platforms but use them less often say the same.

The teens who think they spend too much time on social media also report they would struggle to step back completely from it. Teens who say they spend too much time on social media are 36 percentage points more likely than teens who see their usage as about right to say giving up social media would be hard (78% vs. 42%). In fact, about three-in-ten teens who say they use social media too much (29%) say it would be very hard for them to give up social media. Conversely, a majority of teens who see their social media usage as about right (58%) say that it would be at least somewhat easy for them to give it up.

Rubén Weinsteiner