יום שישי, 27 ביולי 2018

The White House’s new communications chief is making the press corps great again



White House deputy chief of staff Bill Shine walks across Regent's Park in London after he arrived with President Donald Trump


  The Shining


Bill Shine thinks of the White House as his show and of himself as its top booker.

The former Fox News executive, who became President Donald Trump’s deputy chief of staff for communications this month, exercised his booker’s prerogative on Wednesday as he “disinvited” CNN White House correspondent Kaitlan Collins from an open Rose Garden press event. In a subsequent dressing-down Shine gave to Collins in his office, he explained that the ouster was in retaliation for her persistent questioning of Trump at an earlier photo-op, where she represented the television pool.


“Did Michael Cohen betray you, Mr. President?” Collins called out twice as Trump’s press session with president of the European Commission terminated.

She followed with, “Mr. President, are you worried about what Michael Cohen is about to say to the prosecutors? Are you worried about what is on the other tapes, Mr. President?”

And she finished with, “Why is Vladimir Putin not accepting your invitation, Mr. President?”

According to Collins, Shine and press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders said her questions “were inappropriate for that venue” and that she was “shouting” — even though a review of the tape shows Collins producing only the standard decibels for such press sprays.

The usual voices in the press corps united to condemn Shine’s ham-fisted payback—the White House Correspondents’ Association, CNN’s Jake Tapper, New York Times White House reporter Peter Baker, NBC News’ Megyn Kelly, the New Yorker’s Susan Glasser, and many others. But even unusual voices, like Fox News President Jay Wallace, professed shock at Shine’s behavior. “We stand in strong solidarity with CNN for the right to full access for our journalists as part of a free and unfettered press,” Wallace said in a statement.

Long before Trump began yapping about “enemies of the people,” presidents insulted and disciplined the White House press corps for asking tough questions. In 1937, when New York Times reporter Robert Post persisted in asking President Franklin D. Roosevelt at a press conference if he would seek a third term, Roosevelt finally retorted, ”Bob, go put on the dunce cap and stand in the corner.” President Dwight D. Eisenhower so despised the Washington Post he instructed aides to bring him the sports pages only. In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson once censured New York Times reporter Charles Mohr for asking “the Leader of the Free World” a “chicken-shit question” in a one-on-one interview. President Richard M. Nixon, of course, put reporters on his enemies list.

In 1982, Reagan White House aide Michael Deaver foreshadowed Shine by posting a notice that banned hectoring reporters from asking the president questions during photo ops. Deaver issued the ban, ABC News shouter Sam Donaldson said, because Reagan’s impromptu answers frequently exposed him as uninformed. But the Collins dust-up is different. It’s the nature of the questions—about Cohen and Putin—and not their loudness that has so unsettled Trump and his image-minder. Trump seems especially exasperated by the Cohen stories and the attendant discussions about his alleged payouts to paramours. Is he suffering at home because every new wave of sex talk riles his wife Melania? Does he interpret—as he should—that Cohen’s relentless semaphoring about cooperating with prosecutors means that more legal and domestic trouble is impending?

The Collins disinvitation has had another ruinous effect for Trump. It has united the media—if only for a moment—against him. It’s hard to imagine Fox News Channel declaring comradeship with Trump archenemy CNN under any other circumstances. Trump maintains a special loathing for CNN, routinely belittling its management, snubbing its reporter Jim Acosta and even reportedly berating his wife for watching it. That a CNN reporter asked the “inappropriate” questions about his sex-payout scandal did not go unnoticed by Trump. Collins also asked these pointed questions during a week in which Trump’s Putin-fawning at the Helsinki summit caused normally loyal Republicans to throw stones at him and some voters to reject him.(Could press unity be a thing—remember Jordan Fabian ceding question time at a White House press briefing to Hallie Jackson last week?)

Trump repeatedly insists that he doesn’t “need” the press like other presidents—he can command video time whenever he wants and reroute the national conversation with a tweet or a televised denunciation. Rerouting the conversation with a CNN brawl was Trump’s intention, tweeted Mother Jones Editor-in-Chief Clara Jeffery Wednesday. The fight got the media to talk about itself for a few hours.

Yet the president seems so rattled by his one-sided clash with Collins that the White House had to invent an excuse so he could avoid reporters as he exited Washington on Thursday morning to visit Iowa. Normally, the president flies to Joint Base Andrews on his helicopter, and reporters shout questions to him as he walks across the South Lawn to board the craft. Often, he answers. But this morning, as the Hill reported, Trump traveled via motorcade. Aides blamed “bad weather” for the switch, which caused reporters to ask, What bad weather? It’s the nicest day we’ve seen in Washington in a week! Tweets from NBC News reporter Hallie Jackson and others showed nothing but blue skies with a hint of clouds. Here’s a glimpse of the Andrews weather at flight time. Trump obviously sought to avoid reporters—or perhaps his staff sought to protect him from their prying questions.

Having now avoided a formal news conference for 525 days, Trump has brought the shouting of questions at photo-ops — “inappropriate” or not—on himself. As his presidency advances, he’s become a kind of mental recluse who hides in plain sight behind half-thoughts punctuated with placeholder comments like “believe me,” “billions and billions,” and “we’ll see about that.” Our windup president’s extravagantly produced show seems to be winding down.

יום חמישי, 26 ביולי 2018

Trump gets his big moment to boast about trade war


Economists warn that Trump’s trade war sped up U.S. exports in the second quarter, lifting growth in ways likely to be reversed in the coming months.


As President Donald Trump continues to argue that the strong economy and stock market offer him leeway to press his aggressive approach, his trade battles could wind up slowing an economy that is among the GOP’s strongest selling points to voters.President Donald Trump is likely to get one of the best headlines of his presidency on Friday with a highly tweetable report expected to show the U.S. economy grew at its fastest rate in years.


But the big number risks becoming fool’s gold.


Economists warn that Trump’s trade war sped up U.S. exports in the second quarter as China and other countries rushed to snap up American soybeans and other products ahead of impending tariffs, lifting growth in ways likely to be reversed in the coming months.

And as Trump continues to argue that the strong economy and stock market offer him leeway to press his aggressive approach, his trade battles could wind up slowing an economy that is among the GOP’s strongest selling points to voters.

“We are going to see a spike in growth in the second quarter that’s in part related to front-loaded soybeans and other exports and that’s going to be paid back in the next quarter,” said Eric Winograd, senior U.S. economist at Alliance-Bernstein.

Speaking at an event in Illinois on Thursday, Trump boasted about "very big numbers" in the coming GDP report. "I don't know what they are but I think they'll be terrific," he said.

Wall Street’s concern over potential trade wars was on display Wednesday as shares spiked on initial reports of a deal between the U.S. and the E.U. to avoid Trump’s threatened 20 percent tariffs on all imported automobiles and auto parts.


When Trump and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker emerged into the Rose Garden it turned out they had only agreed to further talks. The threat of auto tariffs remains, though it’s reduced for the moment.

Economists across Wall Street expect the second quarter growth number, out Friday at 8:30 a.m., to be a blockbuster. Estimates range from around 4 percent to well over 5 percent, which could exceed the second quarter of 2014, when the economy grew 5.2 percent, the top rate of President Barack Obama’s tenure.

Even subtracting the impact of increased exports ahead of tariffs, the number is likely to be 3 percent or better following a round of tax cuts and increased federal spending.

But a figure of five percent or better is not likely to be repeated, many analysts say, meaning Trump could face the same thing that happened to Obama, a burst of growth followed by a fizzle.

“Trade and inventories together are contributing around 2.2 percent to headline GDP — nearly half of the growth we are estimating,” Morgan Stanley analysts wrote in a note to clients this week. “We find evidence that the hefty contributions from these two categories is likely a reflection of stockpiling ahead of the implementation of trade tariffs, and so they are likely to subtract from growth in the following quarters.”

Morgan Stanley and other big banks and forecasters suggest the real second quarter growth rate will be closer to 2.5 percent, returning to a good-but-not-great pace in the second half of the year. Next year could be slower as the impact of tax cuts and increased government spending begin to wane and the Federal Reserve continues to hike interest rates.

Things could get worse if tariffs continue to bite U.S. manufacturers and farmers who are already complaining loudly about increased costs and sagging prices for their exports. Concern in the farm belt already led to a proposed $12 billion bailout from the Trump administration.

יום ראשון, 22 ביולי 2018

China, EU seize control of the world’s cyber agenda


The U.S. guided global internet policy for decades. Now, the EU and China are taking the lead.






European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, left, greets China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi prior to a meeting at EU headquarters. Beijing and Brussels are effectively writing the rules that may determine the future of the internet.


The United States is losing ground as the internet’s standard-bearer in the face of aggressive European privacy standards and China’s draconian vision for a tightly controlled Web.

The weakening American position comes as the European Union, filling a gap left by years of lax U.S. regulations, imposes data privacy requirements that companies like Facebook and Google must follow. At the same time, China is dictating companies’ security practices with mandates that experts say will undermine global cybersecurity — without any significant pushback from the United States.


The result: Beijing and Brussels are effectively writing the rules that may determine the future of the internet. And China’s vision is spreading across the developing world as it influences similar laws in Vietnam, Tanzania and Nigeria.

Experts in cyber policy say the trends could slow the internet’s growth, stunt innovation and erect new market barriers for American businesses. And while these trends began before Donald Trump became president, his administration has yet to devise a clear plan to rebut either of these agendas.

“The U.S. cannot afford to be on the sidelines,” said Chris Painter, America’s top cyber diplomat from 2011 to 2017, who is now with the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace. “Other countries are doing things legislatively that affect the U.S. … and the U.S. is on the back foot.”

One result of this shift is the erosion of the freewheeling U.S. vision of the internet that had reigned for decades. “The U.S. model looks both paralyzed and somewhat feckless, while the Europeans and the Chinese are making progress and, in many cases, damaging the openness of the internet,” said Adam Segal, director of the Council on Foreign Relations’ cyber policy program. “And we don’t particularly have a coherent response to it.”

The lack of U.S. leadership also harms ordinary Americans by letting industry block the adoption of strong protections against cyberattacks, said Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), one of Congress’ leading voices on cybersecurity and technology issues.

“The United States is failing on cybersecurity because our Congress has been captured by corporations who have successfully killed any effort to impose meaningful cyber standards,” he told us in an email.

For years, the U.S. objected aggressively when China and other authoritarian regimes tried to co-opt international venues to push their cyber agendas. In 2015, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan introduced a “code of conduct for information security,” which would have codified their vision of content regulation, but behind-the-scenes work by the Western governments halted its momentum. The U.S. blocked similar efforts at a United Nations technology commission. And in 2010, the U.S. helped prevent a vote to hand a role in internet policymaking to the International Telecommunications Union, which would have given a stronger hand to authoritarian countries that often lose to the West in other settings.

“In all bilateral and multilateral encounters heretofore, the United States has successfully and consistently, in a bipartisan way, opposed” authoritarian visions for cyberspace, said a former State and Commerce department official who spent eight years working on cyber issues and requested anonymity to speak candidly.

But the U.S. has offered only token opposition to the cybersecurity law that China imposed last year, which among other things requires companies operating in China to provide authorities with the source code to their software.

The U.S. has taken a much more modest approach to its own cybersecurity policy: It passed a cyber information sharing law in 2015 that gave companies legal immunity for sharing threat data with the government, and the National Institute of Technology and Standards introduced a voluntary “framework” for managing digital security risks. Industry groups praised these efforts, saying they influence policies worldwide.

But beyond these piecemeal steps, the U.S. has advanced no coherent vision of cybersecurity regulation to counter the ones from China and Europe. And Russia will soon try again with its cybersecurity “code of conduct” — with vague language discouraging interference in other states’ internal affairs — at the U.N. General Assembly in September.

The U.S. is at a disadvantage, Painter said, because while China and others roll out ambitious plans, American diplomats call for only modest reforms. “If the U.S. line is, ‘Leave the status quo as it is,’ that’s always hard,” he said.

Chinese Communist Party leaders see cybersecurity “as a fundamental part of their governance model,” said Samm Sacks, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And President Xi Jinping has taken a personal interest in the topic, beyond how most world leaders engage with the issue.

Meanwhile, Beijing’s grip on domestic affairs gives it an advantage over the U.S. when it comes to laying down the law.

The result is China’s cybersecurity law, which took effect on June 1, 2017, creating vaguely defined inspection regimes for network operators and critical infrastructure owners. These businesses must let Chinese officials test their equipment and software at any time. They must also store their data in China so investigators can access it. One provision could let Beijing demand companies’ decryption keys, which would effectively ban the unbreakable encryption found in apps like Signal.

But even as the fractious Chinese bureaucracy prepared to implement the law, Beijing was busy promoting its view of digital security controls abroad, focusing on developing nations that it hopes will join a coalition to counter the West’s more open internet agenda.


In a digital extension of its sweeping One Belt One Road initiative, China spent vast sums to expand internet connectivity in small and underdeveloped countries. It donated computers to governments in nearly three dozen countries, from Pakistan to Malawi to the small island state of Tonga. Huawei, the Chinese telecom giant that U.S. officials consider a cybersecurity risk, set up armies of security cameras in the Kenyan cities of Nairobi and Mombasa as part of its “Safe City” initiative.

Cyber experts suspect China’s generosity is driven by its strategic self-interest: Beijing wanted to have a foothold in these emerging countries’ computer networks. Evidence has occasionally emerged to support this view. In January, the French newspaper Le Monde reported that China had spent years spying on the African Union, whose headquarters it built and donated to the international organization in 2012. Buried in the facility’s ready-made computer network, the paper said, were backdoors letting Beijing monitor the African Union’s activities.

“China’s influence is second to none in terms of its relationships with developing countries and in terms of its expanding relationship, recently, with developed countries,” said the former State Department official. As a result, he said, “Chinese companies are essentially the lead [and] have inside access” to countries’ systems.

The U.S. government and American corporations also must deal with a newly aggressive Europe on cyber issues. In August 2016, the EU enacted its first major cyber law, which requires “operators of essential services” to “take appropriate and proportionate … measures to manage” their cyber risks. The EU is now considering another law that would task its cyber agency, ENISA, with certifying security products in EU member states.

Both of these laws will force U.S. companies with European footprints to redesign their security measures to comply, and the more they do so, experts said, the more the EU position becomes the default. The same is true for the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, which imposes tough data privacy and disclosure requirements — including the threat of massive fines for companies that violate them — and could undermine cybersecurity.

The White House is discussing introducing a GDPR competitor, according to news reports, but it may be too late — the European rule effectively kneecapped the United States’ ability to set global privacy standards at a lower level. “If you’re a company,” said the former State Department official, “you have to abide by the stricter standard.”

The question for the U.S. is whether to abandon its insistence on a voluntary, industry-led approach and enact more regulations that reflect a clear U.S. vision. Many experts said the American tradition of letting the private sector shape the debate has undercut the nation’s standing globally.

Other countries “have looked around and said, ‘All right, this doesn’t really seem to be accomplishing very much,’” Segal said.

One option would be to follow China and the EU in passing a sweeping national cyber law. If it took a light touch but still imposed rules, and if the U.S. could demonstrate that it improved security, other countries would take note. But as recent history shows, such a law would have a difficult chance of passing Congress.

James Lewis, a cyber expert at CSIS, said the U.S. was the only country where extreme distrust of government prevented meaningful cyber regulations. “That’s not how it works in the rest of the world,” he said. “And I say that for both democracies and dictatorships. This overwhelming angst we have about government is not reflected anywhere else on the planet.”

Industry executives say regulations aren’t the answer. Chris Boyer, assistant vice president of public policy at AT&T, said the best “opportunity for the U.S. to proactively lead this conversation” lay in voluntary standards.

But many security experts argue that isn’t enough. “These voluntary frameworks,” said Segal, “have not really, as far as we can tell, improved U.S. security significantly.”




Hack an election? These kids will try





Regardless of how the U.S. moves forward, experts said it must engage more aggressively in the international debate. “We should try to provide a clear roadmap of the type of approach we want to see other countries adopting,” said the former State official. “Silence just cedes the ground to other views and other approaches that we fundamentally disagree with.”

Sustained engagement will require a strategy on the part of the Trump administration. For now, the former official said, U.S. diplomats attending these meetings “don’t say anything” and are “not relevant.”

The administration’s cyber leadership void has exacerbated the problem. National Security Adviser John Bolton eliminated the White House cyber coordinator role, the central figure overseeing all U.S. cyber activities, and former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson nixed Painter’s top cyber diplomat role. A deputy assistant secretary of state, Rob Strayer, now manages cyber diplomacy, though a bill to elevate his office is nearing passage.

The State Department did not make Strayer available for an interview about the U.S. strategy.

“The degradation or the removal of certain roles is hugely important,” said Josh Kallmer, the senior vice president for global policy at the Information Technology Industry Council. He said his meetings with administration officials often involve “trying to reverse those things.”

The battle isn’t over yet, and China’s agenda still faces hurdles. For one thing, although its cyber law is technically in place, many of its provisions have not yet been enacted, and regulatory agencies are competing over how to implement it. Plus, Chinese firms that want to dominate global markets are pushing back on Beijing’s attempt to balkanize the internet.

“There are constraints internally in China’s system that are going to be a check on some of the more alarming parts of this vision,” Sacks said.

But even so, China is making a greater effort than the U.S., and the EU isn’t far behind. “For the first time,” said the former State Department official, “many, many, many countries … rank much higher in influence than the U.S.”

Lewis, reflecting on his recent conversations in Europe and Asia, was pessimistic. “The internet is going to be regulated, and it’ll be regulated from Brussels and Beijing,” he said. “We’re kind of out of it, because we don’t have a good counter.”

The dating swamp: How finding love in DC may be impossible for young Trump and GOP staffers


By Barnini Chakraborty



Safe space: Part of the problem is there aren't as many Trump-friendly bars in D.C. compared to past administrations; the Benjamin Bar & Lounge (pictured) is an option but generally expensive (Trump Hotel)

Trying to find love in D.C. can be tricky. If you’re a young Trump administration staffer, it might be near impossible.

GOP employees and other right-wingers have been complaining that dating in one of the most Democratic cities in America is a political minefield.

They’ve been called out, flipped off and told they are personally responsible for the death of democracy.

One 29-year-old lobbyist told Fox News that learning to date in a Trump world is “absolutely insane.”

“It’s getting so bad,” the lobbyist, who asked to remain anonymous because she works with the administration, said.

She, like several people Fox News spoke to, says they’re often raked over hot coals by prospective dates online or simply denied when someone finds out they work – or even voted – for President Trump.


Another person who works for the Trump administration said she has endured insults for simply posing with the American flag.

“Guys say, ‘Are you one of those Trumpies?’ It’s ridiculous,” she laments. “How did posing with the American flag turn me into a country-hating loser?”

Capitol Hill staffer Daniel Jativa said he got the brush off when a girl he was dating found out he accepted a job with a Republican congressman who aligned closely with the House Freedom Caucus.




Ted Dooley, executive director of the college Republican National Committee, who met his wife while campaigning for Charlie Baker in 2014 in Cape Cod, Mass., suggests Republicans look to the party for love (Ted Dooley Twitter)

“I always considered myself a more moderate Republican so some of the things we did talk about, I generally agreed with – things like frustration over partisanship, gridlock, how the discourse against certain groups of people have become unfortunately darker,” he said.

GOP INTERNS: UBER DRIVER REFUSED US SERVICE BECAUSE OF MAGA HATS

He says when the girl found out his boss leaned conservative, Jativa “was immediately called ‘disgusting’ and an ‘enabler’ of racism… of misogyny.”

Suffice it to say, they called it quits.

Another senior Hill staffer told Fox News that she’s been harassed on dating sites so much that she and her friends “stick to our own” these days.

“It’s disheartening,” she said. “Basically, we now all date one another. It’s safer that way. I have a group of friends who are all pretty conservative and we end up dating in the same circle. I didn’t think coming to the heart of the nation’s capital would be like this, but it’s a reality these days.”


I try to steer the conversation away from politics as much as humanly possible. It doesn’t help in the long run but it gets me out of a lengthy lecture about how I am ruining the country. - Janine Olsen

Ted Dooley, executive director of the college Republican National Committee, says he’s heard numerous horror stories of conservatives being berated for their beliefs.

“It reflects the larger tone of our environment that extremists like (Rep.) Maxine Waters, (D-Calif.), are encouraging fringe extremists on the political left to verbally and physically berate those with differing opinions,” he told Fox News. “It’s no surprise that her encouragement has seeped into the personal interactions young people have in all aspects of their lives.”

Relationship expert Christine Bacon said she isn’t surprised by the open hostility from the left.

“It saddens me,” she said.

Bacon, an evangelical Catholic who met her husband in a nightclub 35 years ago, adds that “opposites attract but not in terms of politics because it’s typically based on personality – introverts versus extroverts type of thing.”

One 31-year-old woman Politico interviewed laid out a typical date: “You do the small-talk thing, and you have a very good conversation, and then they might say, 'You didn't vote for Trump, right?'”

She adds, “As soon as I say, 'Of course I did,' it just devolves into all-caps 'HOW COULD YOU BE SUCH A RACIST AND A BIGOT?' And 'You're going to take away your own birth control.'"




Given the backlash, some pro-Trump supporters looking for love say they aren’t above bending the truth.

“I try to steer the conversation away from politics as much as humanly possible,” conservative lobbyist Janine Olsen told Fox News. “It doesn’t help in the long run but it gets me out of a lengthy lecture about how I am ruining the country. I’m not lying. I’m just not offering up my political positions on the first date anymore.”

Part of the problem Olsen admits is there aren’t as many Trump-friendly watering holes as there were during the Obama and Bush administrations. Just four percent of the District’s votes in 2016 went to Trump.

While the Benjamin Bar & Lounge at the Trump International Hotel in D.C. is widely considered a “safe space” for Republicans, basic Bellinis start at $15 with other signature cocktails going as high as $100 a pop. Such prices are not financially feasible for the average Washington worker.

“I’m more of a Guinness gal anyway,” Olsen said with a laugh.

Dooley, who met his wife while campaigning for Charlie Baker in 2014 in Cape Cod, Mass., suggests Republicans look to the party for love.

“The number of friends I have who have met their significant others through their involvement in campaigns of CRs is significant,” he said. “Get out there, elect Republicans, and enjoy the people you meet doing it. Who knows who they might become!”

יום שישי, 20 ביולי 2018

Ideology remains a powerful factor in how Europeans view key policy questions


In Western Europe, Populist Parties Tap Anti-Establishment Frustration but Have Little Appeal Across Ideological Divide




Protesters in Kandel, Germany, demonstrate over migration politics and domestic security in April. (Uli Deck/Picture Alliance via Getty Images)

In Western Europe, populist parties and movements have disrupted the region’s political landscape by making significant gains at the ballot box – from the Brexit referendum to national elections in Italy. The anti-establishment sentiments helping to fuel the populist wave can be found on the left, center and right of the ideological spectrum, as a Pew Research Center survey highlights. People who hold these populist views are more frustrated with traditional institutions, such as their national parliament and the European Union, than are their mainstream counterparts. They are also more concerned about the economy and anxious about the impact of immigrants on their society.

This dissatisfaction may in part be why they are more favorable toward populist parties; still, regardless of populist sentiments, people tend to favor parties that reflect their own ideological orientation. With regard to policy, too, ideology continues to matter. Left-right differences carry more weight than populist sympathies when it comes to how people view the government’s involvement in the economy, as well as the rights of gays and lesbians and women’s role in society.

These are among the findings of an in-depth Pew Research Center public opinion study that maps the political space in eight Western European countries – Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom – based on a survey of 16,114 adults conducted from Oct. 30 to Dec. 20, 2017. Together, these eight European Union (EU) member states account for roughly 70% of the EU population and 75% of the EU economy.1 The study’s purpose is to evaluate how the intersection of ideology and populist views within and across these publics shapes attitudes about policies, institutions, political parties and values.

In this report, survey respondents are categorized into groups based on their self-placement along the left-center-right ideological spectrum and on whether they express support for populist views. The measure of ideology is general and not specific to either economic or social values. The measure of populist views primarily focuses on anti-establishment attitudes – whether respondents believe that ordinary people would do a better job than elected officials at solving the country’s problems, and whether most elected officials care what people like them think. Anti-establishment attitudes constitute a core component of many definitions of populism. In this analysis, the combination of ideology and anti-establishment attitudes leads to the identification of six political groups: Left Populists, Left Mainstream, Center Populists, Center Mainstream, Right Populists and Right Mainstream. (For more on how these groups are defined, please see the explanatory box and Appendix A.)

Analyzing the political landscape in Western Europe
People who hold populist views are more unhappy with institutions, economy and immigration

Across the ideological spectrum, people with populist views share a deep distrust of traditional institutions. This dissatisfaction affects not just attitudes about the national parliament but a range of institutions across society, including the news media and banks, as well as the European Union (EU). In fact, when it comes to opinions of the EU, populist views are often a more significant dividing line than ideology. For example, in the Netherlands, roughly six-in-ten or fewer among the left, center and right populist groups say that membership in the Brussels-based organization has been good for their country’s economy, compared with three-quarters or more among those in the mainstream on the left, center and right. People with populist sympathies also express higher support for returning powers from the EU to their national government than those in the mainstream. (For more on Western European views of the news media, see “In Western Europe, Public Attitudes Toward News Media More Divided by Populist Views Than Left-Right Ideology”.)

Journalists and scholars have fiercely debated whether economic struggles underlie publics’ support for populist movements. By analyzing populist views across the ideological spectrum, this study finds that people who are critical of the establishment are somewhat more likely than those in the mainstream to have faced economic hardship, such as unemployment. Perhaps in part because of this experience, Left, Center and Right Populists are much more dissatisfied with the national economy and, in half the countries surveyed, more likely than their mainstream ideological counterparts to support the government providing economic assistance to the public.

Additionally, anti-establishment sentiments and attitudes about immigration are linked, the study finds. Overall, left-right ideology is the most prominent divide in public attitudes about immigrants. Still, across the left-right spectrum, respondents with populist views are consistently more negative toward immigrants than those in the mainstream who share their ideological position. For example, in the Netherlands, both Left Populist and Left Mainstream respondents are less likely than their counterparts on the right to say immigrants increase the risk of terrorism. At the same time, the Left Populist group (38%) still expresses higher levels of concern than the Left Mainstream (26%). Similarly, the Center and Right Populist groups in the Netherlands generally hold more negative attitudes about immigrants than the Center and Right Mainstream groups, respectively. Across a number of questions about immigrants, Right Populists tend to be the most negative group.



Given this pattern of attitudes, it is perhaps unsurprising that people with anti-establishment views tend to hold more favorable opinions of populist parties. For example, in France, 34% of Right Populist respondents have a positive view of the National Front (FN), a right-aligned populist party, compared with 21% of those in the Right Mainstream.2 Similarly, in the Netherlands, there is a 17-percentage-point gap in favorability toward the right-aligned Party for Freedom (PVV) between the Right Populist and Right Mainstream groups. This pattern holds for nearly all populist parties asked about in the survey.
Still, ideology is the main divide on important policy areas, with smaller differences by populist views

While populist views play a significant role in some key areas, the attitudinal differences between people who place themselves on the left and those who place themselves on the right tend to be larger across a range of major issues asked about. The left-right divide is particularly large on the issue of immigration, but is also quite substantial on attitudes about the role of the government in the economy. A clear illustration of this is the question of whether it is the government’s responsibility to ensure a decent standard of living for all or if it is the individual’s responsibility to do so. In most countries surveyed, respondents categorized as Left Mainstream are at least 20 percentage points more likely than those in the Right Mainstream to say it is the government’s responsibility. While in some cases the populist groups studied are more supportive of government assistance than those in the mainstream, the divide by populist views tends to be smaller than the ideological divide in most countries.

In the UK, for example, nearly seven-in-ten Left Mainstream respondents (68%) think the government should help people have a decent standard of living. About a third of the Right Mainstream agree (32%), for a difference of 36 percentage points. The gaps between the populist and mainstream groups at each point on the ideological scale are much smaller – a 16-point difference between Right Populists and the Right Mainstream, 11 points between the two groups on the left, and a statistically insignificant 4 points in the center.
Attitudes about political parties also largely determined by ideology

While people who are frustrated with the establishment are more supportive of populist parties than respondents in the mainstream groups studied, they have not yet abandoned traditional parties. Instead, people on the left – whether or not they hold populist views – tend to prefer left-leaning political parties, while those on the right prefer right-leaning parties. This pattern reveals that respondents with populist sympathies are not supportive of populist parties irrespective of ideology, but rather are supportive of parties that are consistent with their own ideological leanings.

Categorizing political parties in Western Europe

Despite its significant shift in the party system in the past two years, France provides a clear example of this dynamic. More than four-in-ten of both the Right Mainstream (46%) and Right Populists (44%) have a favorable view of the Republicans (LR), the traditional, right-aligned party in France. Fewer than two-in-ten respondents in the Left Mainstream (15%) and Left Populists (11%) feel the same. Both groups on the left have more positive views than either group on the right of the traditional, left-aligned Socialist Party (PS).

The two populist parties in France that are on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum – the National Front on the right, led by Marine Le Pen, and La France Insoumise on the left, led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon – appeal most strongly to respondents from their respective ideological camps who hold populist views. These two parties repel the populist groups on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum, however. For example, 68% of Left Populist respondents have a favorable view of La France Insoumise, while just 24% of Right Populists say the same.

En Marche – the new party that emerged with Emmanuel Macron in 2016 and is neither traditional nor populist – gets higher ratings from all three mainstream groups, as well as from the two populist groups in the center and on the right. Left Populist respondents are the most negative about the party.


Mapping the political space in Western Europe




This report identifies six key political groups across Western Europe based on people’s left-right ideology and their support for populist views.3 In all countries surveyed, minorities hold populist views, though these minorities are somewhat larger in Spain, Italy and France. Majorities in each country tend to be in the mainstream (defined as not holding populist views). A seventh group is the Unaligned – individuals who do not place themselves on the left-right ideological spectrum.

The political groups differ considerably from each other in terms of demographics. Populists tend to be less affluent and less educated than those in the mainstream, and they often express lower levels of political interest. In most countries, people on the ideological left tend to be younger than those in the center or on the right, with the Center Mainstream and Right Mainstream standing out as among the oldest groups in many countries. The Unaligned group is often the least affluent, least educated and least politically interested of all the groups. And unlike most other groups, which have similar gender balances, the Unaligned tend to be disproportionately female.

These groups differ widely from one another in their positions on various issues, too. The Right Mainstream stand out for the primacy they place on individual responsibility, while the Left Mainstream tend to support government involvement in the economy. Right Populists express the most skepticism of the European Union and its impact on their country, though Left and Center Populists also say the Brussels-based institution negatively affects their country’s economy at higher rates than those in the mainstream. The two groups on the right also tend to express more concerns about immigrants than those on the left, with Right Populists standing out as the most negative.
Defining distinct political groups across Western Europe

This report analyzes six political groups and a seventh group of Unaligned respondents. The groups are created based on two key dimensions: left-right ideological self-placement and populist views. Respondents were asked to place themselves along an ideological scale, ranging from far left (zero) to far right (six). Based on this self-report, people are classified as left (zero to two), center (three) or right (four to six). Those who did not offer an ideological self-placement are classified as Unaligned.

These three ideological groups are further divided by populist and mainstream views. The measure of populist views used in this survey is based on respondents’ answers to two questions: 1) Ordinary people would do a better job/do no better solving the country’s problems than elected officials and 2) Most elected officials care/don’t care what people like me think. Those who answered that elected officials do not care about people like them and who say ordinary people would do a better job solving the country’s problems than elected officials are considered to hold populist views; everyone else is considered to hold mainstream views. (For more details on how these groups were created, see Appendix A.)

Combining the measures of ideology and populist views results in seven analytical groups: Left Populists, Left Mainstream, Center Populists, Center Mainstream, Right Populists, Right Mainstream and the Unaligned. These groups show distinct attitudinal patterns.

Left Mainstream: This group expresses higher support for gender equality, LGBT rights and government involvement in the economy. They also tend to be the group most likely to say that EU membership has benefited their country’s economy. In most countries, the Left Mainstream stand apart substantially from the Right Mainstream on the issue of immigrants; those in the Left Mainstream are the least likely to see immigrants as a burden on the economy.

Left Populists: This group holds relatively similar views to those in the Left Mainstream, with two notable exceptions. First, Left Populists are more skeptical of the EU than those in the Left Mainstream. Second, in a majority of countries, they are more likely than those in the Left Mainstream to say that regulating business is bad.

Center Mainstream: This group tends to fall somewhere between the Left Mainstream and the Right Mainstream on most issues. For example, while majorities of the Center Mainstream in most countries support LGBT couples being able to adopt children, they are somewhat less supportive than those in the Left Mainstream and more supportive than those in the Right Mainstream. The same is true when it comes to views of immigrants. But, when it comes to views of government regulation of the economy, in most countries, the Center Mainstream tend to look slightly more like the Right Mainstream than the Left Mainstream.

Center Populists: Similar to the Center Mainstream, this group tends to have attitudes that place them somewhat between Left Populists and Right Populists. For example, when it comes to attitudes about immigrants, Center Populists are more likely than Left Populists to think that immigrants increase the risk of terrorist attacks but less likely than Right Populists to feel that way. But, like populist groups across the ideological spectrum, Center Populists are more likely than those in the mainstream to see the EU’s influence as negative.

Right Mainstream: This group stands apart from others for the emphasis they place on individual, rather than government, responsibility in economic issues. Beyond this sense that the government should intervene little in the economy, the Right Mainstream also tend to be the most traditional on social issues of all of the groups, and they are relatively more negative about the impact of immigrants. Most in the Right Mainstream also have positive opinions of the EU’s impact on their country.

Right Populists: Right Populists stand apart from the other groups for their very negative attitudes about the EU and immigrants. For example, they are more likely to see immigrants as a burden on the economy, even relative to Left Populists and Center Populists, and majorities tend to think immigrants increase the risk of terrorist attacks. Right Populists differ little from the Right Mainstream on social issues.
Younger people tend to fall on the ideological left

The seven groups differ considerably in age. In most countries, those on the ideological left tend to be younger than those in the center or on the right. These differences are generally larger than differences between populists and the mainstream. For example, in the UK, 34% of the Left Mainstream and 35% of Left Populists are younger than 30, compared with 17% of the Right Mainstream and 20% of Right Populists.
Populist groups, Unaligned tend to be less economically well-off and less educated than those in the mainstream

Populist groups are somewhat more likely to have experienced unemployment. For example, in Denmark, 37% of Center Populists say they or their family members have been unemployed or looked for work for more than three months during the past year, compared with 19% of the Center Mainstream. There are also smaller gaps of 11 percentage points between Left Populists (31%) and the Left Mainstream (20%) in Denmark and of 8 points between Right Populists and the Right Mainstream (24% vs. 16%). Aside from Germany, at least three-in-ten Left Populists have had some experience with unemployment.

Still, the percentage of the public that has had experience with unemployment differs widely across countries. In Germany and Sweden, experience with unemployment is below 20% for nearly all groups, while at least three-in-ten of all groups say they or their families have been unemployed in the past year in France, Spain and Italy.

People who endorse populist views and the Unaligned also stand out for having relatively lower incomes than those in the mainstream.4 For example, in the UK, 44% or more of Left Populists, Center Populists and Right Populists are lower income, compared with 28% of the Center Mainstream, 35% of the Left Mainstream and 41% of the Right Mainstream. The Unaligned tend to be among the least well-off of all the political groups; in all eight countries, roughly half or more have lower incomes, ranging from a low of 47% in Germany and Sweden to a high of 66% in Spain. By comparison, fewer than 40% of the Left Mainstream are lower income in most surveyed countries.

Finally, the Unaligned and populist groups also tend to be somewhat less educated than the mainstream. In the Netherlands, for example, 88% of the Unaligned have no postsecondary education. The same is true for around eight-in-ten of each of that country’s populist groups. In contrast, only 55% of the Left Mainstream and 66% of the Right Mainstream fall into this lower educational group.

While those with populist views on the left and right tend to have less education than those in the mainstream, this is particularly true of Right Populists. For example, in Germany, 84% of Right Populists have a secondary education or less, compared with 79% and 73% of Center and Left Populists, respectively. Among the German mainstream groups, around six-in-ten or fewer have a secondary education or less. Germany also exhibits a pattern common in most countries: The Left Mainstream tend to be the most educated. Around half of the German Left Mainstream (48%) have a university degree, compared with 36% of the Center Mainstream and 40% of the Right Mainstream.
Unaligned and populist groups are less politically engaged

Western Europeans tend to be relatively interested in politics, with a median of 55% saying they are at least somewhat interested in the topic. This varies widely by country, however, from a high of 70% in Germany to a low of 37% in Italy.

The Unaligned are by far the least politically engaged among the groups in all countries. In Spain, for example, only 15% of the Unaligned say they are interested in politics – nearly 30 percentage points lower than the next-least-interested group in the country, the Center Populists. Perhaps reflecting its limited political engagement, the Unaligned group also stands out for having the most people who do not identify with any particular political party in their country. In six of the eight countries, the Unaligned group is at least 20 percentage points less likely to have a partisan identification than any other group in the country. For example, in Sweden, 69% of the Unaligned do not identify with a party, compared with 36% of Center Populists, the next most unaffiliated group.

People with populist sympathies tend to be less politically engaged than those in the mainstream. This is particularly the case for Center Populists. In six of the eight countries, fewer than half of Center Populists say they are interested in politics, with the notable exceptions being France and Germany (where 53% and 66% are interested in politics, respectively). Among mainstream groups, around six-in-ten or more in each country say they are interested in the topic, ranging from 58% in Italy and the Netherlands to highs of 83% in Germany, though interest is somewhat higher among the Left Mainstream. Center Populists also have the highest rates of partisan unaffiliation outside of the Unaligned.

When it comes to political interest, there are two exceptions. Whereas in many countries the Left Populists are among the least interested groups, in Spain, Left Populists are the most interested in politics, with 68% saying they are very or somewhat interested, compared with 60% or less in all other groups (such as 44% of Center Populists and 45% of Right Populists). In the Netherlands, too, Left Populists (58%) have high interest levels that mirror those of the Left and Right Mainstream (58% and 56%, respectively).


On economic policy, Western European public opinion deeply divided along traditional ideological lines

By Katie Simmons, Laura Silver, Courtney Johnson, Kyle Taylor and Richard Wike

Western European publics generally favor an active role for the government in the economy. More than half of the public in most countries surveyed say it is the government’s responsibility to ensure a decent standard of living for all, and similar shares also say that government regulation of business is generally good for society. However, these eight publics differ markedly in their assessments of how their economies are performing.

Opinions on economic policy largely break along traditional left-right ideological lines.5 Most of those on the left favor government intervention in the economy, while those on the right are more skeptical. Populists’ views tend to fall closest to their mainstream ideological counterparts. Left Populists are usually most similar to the Left Mainstream; Right Populists, to the Right Mainstream. But to the degree that people with populist sympathies differ from people in the mainstream, they are somewhat more likely to see the government as having a responsibility to guarantee everyone a basic standard of living and somewhat less likely to support regulating business. Populists across the ideological spectrum are also much more pessimistic about the state of the economy, in general, than those in the mainstream.
Amid divides across countries in ratings of economy, those with populist views are more negative

European publics diverge in their assessments of their country’s economies. More than eight-in-ten in Sweden (87%), Denmark (87%), the Netherlands (86%) and Germany (85%) say their current economic situation is good, compared with fewer than half who say the same elsewhere. Italians and Spaniards are especially negative: 71% in Spain and 82% in Italy say the economic situation is bad, with 34% of Spaniards and 31% of Italians saying it is very bad.

People with populist views are generally less positive about the economy than those in the mainstream. France illustrates this pattern well. There, similar minorities of Left, Center and Right Populists see the economy doing well (24%, 21% and 27%, respectively) – assessments which are significantly lower than those of the Left, Center and Right Mainstream (44%, 43% and 41%, respectively).

Germany follows a similar pattern: Roughly nine-in-ten of the Left (91%), Center (92%) and Right Mainstream (88%) say the current economic situation in Germany is good, while about three-quarters of Left (76%), Center (74%) and Right Populists (77%) feel the same.
Left and right split over government’s responsibility to guarantee a decent standard of living

More than half of the public in six of the eight countries surveyed say it is the government’s responsibility to ensure a decent standard of living for all. Support for government assistance is highest in Italy and Spain, where more than six-in-ten say it is the government’s responsibility, including 55% in Italy and 43% in Spain who feel this way strongly. Germany is the only country where public opinion falls on the other side of this issue: Just 35% of Germans think the government should be responsible, while 57% say that individuals should earn a decent standard of living for themselves.

Left-right ideology is central to how people feel about this issue. In general, most on the left place responsibility on the government to guarantee that everyone has a decent standard of living, while many on the right do not. In seven of the eight countries – the notable exception being Germany – widespread majorities of roughly seven-in-ten or more of groups on the left place the responsibility on government. For example, in the Netherlands, 71% of the Left Mainstream take this position compared with half of the Right Mainstream.

In Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, people with populist views differ little from their mainstream counterparts on this issue. Take Denmark as an example: About seven-in-ten Danes on the left favor government responsibility – including 71% of the Left Mainstream and 69% of Left Populists. On the other end of the spectrum, about four-in-ten on the right say the same, with little difference between the Right Mainstream and Right Populists.

In France, Italy, Spain and the UK, there are more pronounced differences between populists and the rest of the public, with populists being somewhat more likely to express support for government assistance than those in the mainstream. For instance, about three-quarters of French Left Populists (77%) say it is government’s responsibility to ensure a decent standard of living for all, compared with two-thirds of the French Left Mainstream. And while those on the right are generally less favorable to government guarantees, Right Populists in Italy, Spain and the UK are more open to government solutions than the Right Mainstream.
On government regulation of business, left-right divides are somewhat more consistent than differences by populist views

In each country surveyed, about half or more say it is generally good for society if government regulates business. This ranges from a high of 72% in Spain to a low of 51% in the Netherlands.

Views on regulation, like those on the social safety net, are grounded in ideology. Most on the left say it is good to regulate business, while the right tends to be less in favor. But populist views also play a role on this issue, especially on the left. Left Populists tend to be significantly more likely than the Left Mainstream to say regulation is bad, while Right Populists differ little from the Right Mainstream in their evaluations.

Denmark provides a clear example: While many on the left say regulation is a good thing, the Left Mainstream (69%) are significantly more likely to take that stance than Left Populists (52%). In contrast, Danish Right Populists and the Right Mainstream are equally likely to say regulation is good – 46% of each group. In Italy and France, Right Populists differ from the Right Mainstream and are much less supportive of regulation.






Ideological right more traditional on social issues




Most people across Western Europe support allowing gays and lesbians to adopt children, and many also believe family life is better when women have full-time jobs. While these opinions are fairly widespread, the ideological left is more likely to hold these views than the right. Traditional left-right ideology strongly divides people’s views on gay and lesbian adoption across much of Western Europe, with populist sympathies playing only a limited role.6
Wide support for allowing gays and lesbians to adopt children

In seven of the eight countries surveyed, about two-thirds or more of the public believes gays and lesbians should be able to adopt children. And in six of these countries, more than half feel this way strongly. Italy is a notable exception. There, roughly half (52%) oppose allowing gays and lesbians to adopt children, and 42% strongly oppose it.

Left-right ideology influences how people feel about the issue, for both populist groups and those in the mainstream. The differences between left and right are generally in the level of support, not the direction of it: Outside of Italy, all groups on both the left and the right support adoption by gays and lesbians, but support is more widespread on the left.

Across the region, there is a clear left-right divide on this issue: In every country, the Left Mainstream are more likely than the Right Mainstream to support adoption by gays and lesbians. The same is true for Left Populists compared with Right Populists. For example, in the UK, 88% of the Left Mainstream say gays and lesbians should be able adopt children, while 65% of the Right Mainstream agree. There is a similar 20-percentage-point difference between Left Populists and Right Populists. Groups on the left are also much more likely to express strong support than those on the right. Continuing the example of the UK, 68% of Left Populists and 74% of the Left Mainstream strongly support adoption by gays and lesbians, compared with 38% of Right Populists and 43% of the Right Mainstream.
Less regional consensus when it comes to views on gender roles

A median of 58% across Western Europe say it is better for family life when women have full-time jobs. In Sweden, more than half (53%) feel this way strongly. Italy, Germany and the Netherlands are more divided. In these countries, more than four-in-ten say family life is worse when women have full-time jobs.

This issue is not as ideologically divisive as adoption by gays and lesbians, but there are still significant differences between the left and the right in five countries. For example, roughly three-quarters of Spaniards who place themselves on the left say it is better for family life when women have full-time jobs, including 77% of Left Populists and 72% of the Left Mainstream. Fewer on the right take this view, though majorities of both Right Populists (64%) and the Right Mainstream (58%) agree.

There are minimal differences between those with populist views and those in the mainstream. However, in Denmark, Germany and the UK, the Left Mainstream are more likely than Left Populists to say it is better for family life when women have full-time jobs. In the UK, for instance, nearly seven-in-ten in the Left Mainstream (68%) say family life is better when women have full-time jobs, compared with 51% of Left Populists. Only in Denmark is there a significant difference between groups on the right.






Stark left-right divides on attitudes about immigration




Most Western Europeans think immigrants strengthen their national economies. However, publics are more split on whether immigrants increase the risk of terrorism in their countries and overwhelmingly say it is best if immigrants adopt the customs and traditions of the country to which they’ve moved.

People’s left-right ideological positions shape their attitudes about immigration more than whether they hold populist views.7 Those on the left are significantly more positive than the groups on the right about immigration’s impact on their country. Still, people with populist views are consistently more likely than their mainstream ideological counterparts to think immigrants have a negative impact on jobs and domestic security, with Right Populists often being the most concerned about the effects of immigration.
Most Western Europeans say immigrants help the economy

Half or more adults in seven of the eight Western European countries surveyed say immigrants make their country’s economy stronger because of their work and talents. This feeling is most widespread in both Sweden and the UK (72%). About three-in-ten or fewer in seven of the eight countries believe immigrants are a burden on their economy because they take the country’s jobs.

Only in Italy is the public divided; nearly equal shares say immigrants make the economy stronger (45%) as say they are a burden (44%).

Across all eight countries, people on the ideological right are more likely than those on the left to think immigrants are an economic burden. For example, about half of the Italian Right Mainstream (51%) see immigrants as an economic burden, compared with just 18% of those in the Left Mainstream. In the Netherlands, 34% of those in the Right Mainstream say immigrants negatively impact the economy, while just 12% of the Left Mainstream agree.

In nearly all countries surveyed, the differences between those who hold populist views and those in the mainstream are also significant, with those espousing populist views tending to be more negative about the impact of immigration on their national economies. In Germany, for example, Right Populists (47%) are significantly more likely than their mainstream counterparts (20%) to see immigrants as a burden. German Left Populists are also more likely than the Left Mainstream (23% vs. 5%) to share this view, as are Center Populists compared with the Center Mainstream (29% vs. 15%).

In most countries, Right Populists are the most likely of all groups to see immigrants as a drain on the economy.
Many Western European publics split on how immigration impacts terror risks

While a majority of people across Western Europe think immigration strengthens their economies, publics are split on whether immigration increases the risk of terrorist attacks in their countries.

Germans (51%) and Italians (50%) are the most likely to say immigrants increase the risk of terrorism in their country. Italians are also the most likely to say they strongly hold this view (34%).

But half or more in five countries – the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK, Spain and France – say immigrants do not increase the risk of terrorist attacks in their country.

Left-right ideology tends to influence people’s attitudes about immigration’s impact on security more than populist views. In every country, people on the right are more likely than those on the left to think immigrants increase the risk of terrorism in their countries. Differences between those on the left and those on the right in each country range from 24 to 31 percentage points. For example, 58% of Germans in the Right Mainstream say immigrants are a security risk, compared with just 28% of Germans in the Left Mainstream.

Still, in most countries, populist groups are more negative toward immigrants on the issue of security than their mainstream counterparts. For example, 32% of British Left Populists think immigrants increase the risk of terrorism, compared with just 17% of the Left Mainstream.

Right Populists everywhere stand out for their negative views of immigrants. In every country surveyed, at least half of Right Populists think immigrants increase the likelihood of terror. This is particularly the case in Italy, Germany and Sweden, where around seven-in-ten or more Right Populists hold this position, about 20 percentage points higher than the Right Mainstream in each country. In most countries, Right Populists are also the most likely to say they strongly think immigrants increase terrorism risks.
Western Europeans overwhelmingly want immigrants to integrate

Roughly seven-in-ten in most Western European countries think it is necessary for the good of society that immigrants adopt the customs and traditions of their new country. Fewer Swedes say integration is essential, though a majority (61%) still endorses it.

As with views on immigrants’ impact on the economy and terrorism, left-right ideology tends to shape peoples’ views on integration more than populist views. In all countries, those on the right are much more likely than those on the left to say it’s necessary for immigrants to adopt the customs and traditions of their new country. For instance, 81% of Dutch people in the Right Mainstream say integration is necessary, compared with 56% of Left Mainstream.

Still, in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, populist attitudes also color people’s views of immigrant integration, with those who hold populist views being more likely to believe immigrants need to integrate than their mainstream counterparts. For example, in Germany, 82% of Left Populists say immigrants must adopt German customs and traditions, versus 51% of the Left Mainstream.
















Populist groups across the ideological spectrum have low trust in institutions




Across Western Europe, publics express very different levels of trust in institutions. While the military is the most highly rated across all eight countries, publics in France, Spain, Italy and the UK express much lower levels of trust in other institutions, including financial institutions, the news media and the national parliament.

In all countries surveyed, people who espouse populist views have significantly less trust in key institutions than those in the mainstream. These populist-mainstream differences in trust are especially pronounced when it comes to views of the national parliament, and they overshadow the gap between those on the ideological left and right.8
Trust in most institutions is low in France, Italy, Spain and the UK

The military is the most trusted of the four institutions asked about in Western Europe (the military, the news media, financial institutions and the national parliament). In all eight countries, at least two-thirds say they trust the military, ranging from a low of 66% in Spain to a high of 84% in France.

Trust is generally lower for the other three institutions. Across all eight countries, no more than about seven-in-ten say they trust the national parliament, banks or the news media. And in three of the countries surveyed – France, Italy and Spain – fewer than four-in-ten say this. In these three countries, the national parliament is particularly poorly rated; only 33% of the French and 16% of both Italians and Spaniards say they trust the institution. These three countries also rate the news media and financial institutions much lower than the other countries surveyed.

Similarly, in the United Kingdom, few trust the national parliament or the news media. Roughly a third trust either of these institutions, though a higher percentage (54%) views banks in a positive light.
Populist groups across the ideological spectrum trust the national parliament, news media less than those in the mainstream

In general, populists express lower levels of trust in institutions than those in the mainstream. This is true for all four institutions asked about – the national parliament, the news media, banks and financial institutions, and even the military.

Differences between people with populist views and the mainstream are most pronounced when it comes to trust in the national parliament. In five of the eight countries, Left Populists and Right Populists are at least 25 percentage points less likely to trust the national parliament than the Left Mainstream or Right Mainstream, respectively. For example, in Denmark, 16% of Left Populists trust the institution, compared with 61% of the Left Mainstream; similarly, 27% of Right Populists trust parliament, compared with 64% of the Right Mainstream. In no country do more than half of any of the three populist groups say they trust parliament – though it ranges from a low of 4% among Left Populists in Spain to a high of 49% among Center Populists in the Netherlands.

While significantly more people in the mainstream groups trust parliament than in the three populist groups, there is some ideological variation that largely mirrors which parties are in power. For example, in Sweden – currently governed by a left-leaning coalition – 88% of the Left Mainstream trust the national parliament, compared with 76% of the Center Mainstream and 71% of the Right Mainstream. The opposite is true in the Conservative-led UK; there, 46% of the Left Mainstream and 40% of the Center Mainstream trust the national parliament, compared with 55% of the Right Mainstream.

Populists on the left and the right also trust the news media less than those in the mainstream. For example, in Germany, a majority of the Left Mainstream (74%), Center Mainstream (71%) and Right Mainstream (65%) all trust the news media; in contrast, half or fewer of Left (44%), Center (50%) and Right Populists (38%) feel the same. Gaps in trust in the media between those with populist views and the mainstream tend to be significantly larger and more consistent than those between the ideological left and right. (For more on Western European attitudes about the news media, see “In Western Europe, Public Attitudes Toward News Media More Divided by Populist Views Than Left-Right Ideology.”)
Left Populists have particularly low trust in financial institutions

In six of the eight countries surveyed, people on the ideological right trust financial institutions more than those on the left (the notable exceptions being Germany and Italy). For example, 64% of the Right Mainstream in the UK trust banks, compared with 50% of the Left Mainstream. As with other institutions, people with populist views tend to express lower levels of trust in banks than those in the mainstream. Looking again at the UK, 64% of the Right Mainstream trust banks, compared with 51% of British Right Populists.

Still, Left Populists stand out for their low levels of trust in financial institutions. For example, in the UK, only about a third (32%) of Left Populists trust banks, compared with half or more in all other groups. Trust is particularly low among Left Populists in Spain, where only 8% trust banks.

Finally, with regard to trust in the military, differences between populists and the mainstream are more muted. While those with populist views are still less likely to trust the military than the mainstream in nearly all countries, the difference centers on Left Populists. In all countries, they have the lowest levels of trust in the military. For example, in Spain, whereas half or more of all other groups say they trust the military, 41% of Left Populists say the same.


People who hold populist views are less likely to see EU membership bringing economic benefits




A majority of Western Europeans in the eight countries surveyed say membership in the European Union has been a good thing for their nation’s economy. Despite these views, majorities say some EU powers should be returned to national governments.

Those on the left tend to be relatively more pro-EU than those on the right.9 People with populist views have less positive attitudes about the institution’s economic benefits, and more of a desire for some EU powers to be returned.
Most Western Europeans say EU membership has economic benefits

Majorities in every country but Italy say EU membership has benefited their country economically. This sentiment is most widespread in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, where about seven-in-ten or more see EU membership as a good thing.

Italians are split on how EU membership has affected their country: 46% say membership has been good for the economy, while 48% say it has been bad. And nearly one-third (32%) say they strongly feel EU membership has harmed the Italian economy.

In every country surveyed, people who hold populist views are less likely than those in the mainstream to say EU membership has positively impacted their nation’s economy. In half of the countries, Left Populists and Right Populists feel similarly about the institution – despite significant differences among their countries’ Left and Right Mainstream. For example, in the Netherlands, just 52% of Right Populists say the EU has been good for their economy, as do 55% of Left Populists and 59% of Center Populists. Among the mainstream in the Netherlands, much larger majorities see EU membership as an economic positive: 86% of the Left Mainstream, 81% of the Center Mainstream and 75% of the Right Mainstream say EU membership has benefited their national economy.

In most countries – France, Italy, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany – people on the left are more likely than those on the right to see EU membership as a good thing for the economy. For example, in Italy and the UK, Left Mainstream respondents are 22 percentage points more likely than the Right Mainstream to say EU membership has helped their economy. In Spain, however, the left-right pattern is reversed: For example, the Right Mainstream group (78%) is somewhat more likely than the Left Mainstream (70%) to see EU membership as an economic positive.
Most want some EU powers returned to national governments

Despite widespread belief in most countries that the EU has benefited national economies, roughly half or more in all countries surveyed say they want some EU powers returned to national governments. Even in Denmark and the Netherlands – countries where broad majorities see economic benefits from the institution – roughly two-thirds say some EU powers should be returned.

The desire for returning EU powers to individual countries is most widespread in the UK, where the national government is currently negotiating an exit from the EU. Nearly three-quarters of Brits (73%) say they want to see some powers returned. Germans and Spaniards are the least likely to favor this type of change (53% and 49%, respectively).

People who hold populist views are more likely than those in the mainstream to want more national sovereignty in seven of the eight countries surveyed. For example, in France, 68% of Left Populists support EU powers being returned to national governments, compared with 54% of the Left Mainstream; on the right, 76% of Right Populists say the same, versus 61% of the Right Mainstream. The one exception to this pattern is the UK, where populists and mainstream respondents largely agree on this issue.

Ideology also plays a role in how people view the division of powers between the EU and national governments. Across five of the eight countries, those on the ideological right are significantly more likely than those on the left to think that powers should be returned to national governments. For example, British Right Mainstream respondents (82%) are more likely than the Left Mainstream (59%) to want powers returned to their national government.

The three countries where those on the right are not more likely than those on the left to support the return of powers to national governments are France, Spain and Sweden. In France and Sweden, those on both sides of the ideological spectrum largely agree on the issue, while in Spain, the left is more likely than the right to want powers returned. For example, Spain’s Left Mainstream (56%) are more likely than those in the Right Mainstream (40%) to think some EU powers should be returned.


Left-right ideology influences political party support across Western Europe more than populist views




In most countries, traditional parties are seen in a more favorable light than populist parties. Public attitudes about parties – whether traditional or populist – are usually closely related to left-right ideology.10 People on the left tend to support parties on the left, while those on the right tend to favor right-aligned parties. Still, within these left-right differences, opinions of traditional parties follow a consistent pattern: People in the mainstream usually have more favorable views of these parties than people with populist views. Opinions of populist parties follow the opposite pattern: People with populist views tend to see the populist parties more favorably than those in the mainstream.
Traditional parties receive low ratings in France, Italy and Spain

Traditional parties in Western Europe are seen in relatively favorable terms in Denmark, Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands (see the text box and Appendix B for more on how parties are classified). In each of these countries, half or more of the public has positive opinions of all traditional parties asked about. For example, a majority of Danes have a favorable view of the left-leaning traditional party, the Social Democrats (66%), and the right-leaning Liberal Party (55%).

Categorizing political parties in Western Europe

In Spain, Italy and France, only minorities rate any of the traditional parties favorably. In these three countries, about three-in-ten or fewer have a favorable view of the Socialist Party (PS) and the Republicans (LR) in France (26% each), the Democratic Party (PD) and Forza Italia in Italy (30% each) and the Popular Party (PP) in Spain (31%), which is sometimes called the People’s Party.11 Only the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) has moderately broad appeal – yet even then, fewer than half of Spaniards view the party favorably (44%).
Views of traditional parties heavily colored by ideology

In all countries surveyed, people on the right tend to have more favorable opinions of right-aligned traditional parties than people on the left, and vice versa. This general pattern holds for both people who have populist views and people in the mainstream. However, to the degree that respondents with populist sympathies differ from mainstream respondents, populists tend to give lower favorability ratings to traditional parties.

One clear example of this pattern occurs in the Netherlands. A majority of people on the left have a favorable view of the left-leaning Labor Party (PvdA). Fewer than half of either group on the right have positive opinions of the party. However, Left Populists (57% favorable) have a lower opinion of the party than the Left Mainstream (76%), and the same is true when comparing Center Populists with the Center Mainstream (44% to 59%, respectively). Right Populists and the Right Mainstream have similarly negative views of the left-leaning PvdA (45% and 43%, respectively).

When it comes to Dutch views of the right-aligned traditional party, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the pattern largely reverses. Here, people on the right tend to have more favorable views of the party than people on the left – and on the left and right, populists tend to have lower views of the party than those in the mainstream. For example, respondents in the Right Mainstream (70%) have a much more favorable view of the party than those in the Left Mainstream (46%) – but both mainstream groups have more favorable opinions than their populist counterparts, with 52% of Right Populists and 29% of Left Populists expressing favorable opinions, respectively.12


Populist parties generally disliked by the public

Across all countries, most populist parties – meaning those that are rated as anti-elitist by experts – are broadly disliked.13 Only minorities have a favorable view of these parties, ranging from 39% of Italians who have a positive view of the Five Star Movement to 11% of Germans who hold a favorable view of Alternative for Germany (AfD).14

For most of the populist parties on the right that were asked about, two-thirds or more of the public say they have an unfavorable view of each party. And, in the case of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) (49%), the Sweden Democrats (51%), the National Front (FN) in France (53%) and AfD in Germany (62%), about half or more express very unfavorable views of the parties.15

Italy’s Five Star Movement is relatively well-regarded among populist parties on the ideological right, receiving the highest favorability of all parties asked about (39%). But Five Star is also one of the few right-aligned populist parties that experts do not classify as “radical right”; rather, the party is relatively centrist in its ideology.16 Still, more Italians have unfavorable (51%) than favorable views of the party.

The Danish People’s Party (DPP), which, like Five Star, is relatively more centrist among right populist parties, is also somewhat more popular than most right populist parties.17 Nevertheless, a majority of Danish adults (62%) have unfavorable views of the party.

A majority of the French and Spanish publics also dislike the left-aligned populist parties La France Insoumise and Podemos, respectively. Fully 46% of Spaniards have very unfavorable opinions of Podemos.
Populist parties receive higher ratings from people with populist views, but many parties still only have minority appeal

Views of populist parties follow the same general pattern as views of traditional parties: Whether populists or in the mainstream, people are more favorable to parties that fall on the same side of the left-right ideological spectrum as they do. But here the dynamics around populist views of parties are flipped, in that people with populist sympathies are more favorable toward these populist parties than are people in the mainstream.

For example, 44% of Right Populists in Germany have a favorable opinion of AfD, compared with just 25% of the Right Mainstream. Both of these right-leaning groups give AfD much higher ratings than either group on the left – whether Left Populists (8%) or the Left Mainstream (2%).

The two populist parties on the right that are somewhat less ideologically extreme – DPP in Denmark and Five Star in Italy – follow a similar pattern to the other populist parties, but they each stand out in an important way.

Unlike most other right populist parties, the DPP is viewed similarly by both the Right Mainstream and Right Populists in terms of favorability (44% for both). However, Danish Left Populists feel more favorably toward the party than the Left Mainstream (28% vs. 19%), as do Center Populists compared with the Center Mainstream (43% vs. 31%).

Five Star also has stronger support among those with populist views than among the mainstream. But, in contrast with most other populist parties, there is little difference between Left and Right Populists, with 44% and 43% holding favorable views of Five Star, respectively. In fact, Five Star’s base of support is strongest among Center Populists (53%).

When it comes to views of populist parties on the left, they, too, receive more support from populist groups than mainstream ones. The left populist La France Insoumise gets its highest favorability ratings from the Left Populists (68%), although a majority of the Left Mainstream (57%) also hold a positive opinion of the party. But both of these ratings stand significantly above those of the right-leaning groups, where just 24% of Right Populists and 20% of the Right Mainstream express positive opinions of the party.

But, while populist parties generally receive more support from those espousing populist views than those in the mainstream, still, only some receive support from more than half of people who hold populist views. These include the left populist parties La France Insoumise and Podemos, which are viewed favorably by 68% and 54% of Left Populists in their respective countries. On the right, the Northern League (LN) and the Sweden Democrats each have majority support among Right Populists in Italy (59%) and in Sweden (60%), respectively. The Five Star Movement, too, is favored by 53% of Center Populists in Italy.
In France and Spain, other nontraditional parties are relatively popular

In France and Spain, newer parties have emerged into the national political landscapes in more recent years that have achieved relative electoral success and popularity.

These relatively new parties, En Marche and Ciudadanos, are more popular than any of the traditional (or populist) parties in their respective countries, with 43% of the French holding a positive opinion of En Marche and 51% of Spaniards saying the same of Ciudadanos.

When it comes to how these parties are seen, the favorability pattern for Ciudadanos largely mirrors those of traditional parties. Views of the Spanish party are mostly driven by left-right ideology, and those in the mainstream tend to have more favorable opinions of Ciudadanos than those with populist leanings.

For example, 64% of Right Populists have positive views of the party, compared with 54% of Center Populists and only 13% of Left Populists. But the Right Mainstream are 10 percentage points more likely to have a favorable view of the party than Right Populists (74% vs. 64%), and the Left Mainstream (27%) view it more favorably than Left Populists (13%).

Views of En Marche, too, generally follow the traditional party pattern, with people’s views being shaped, at least in part, by left-right ideology. French adults on the right are more likely to have a favorable opinion of En Marche than those on the left; for example, 57% of the Right Mainstream express a positive view of the party, compared with only 47% of the Left Mainstream. And people in the mainstream groups are more favorable toward En Marche than those with populist leanings.