יום שישי, 22 ביולי 2022

How the American middle class has changed in the past five decades



Rubén Weinsteiner


The middle class, once the economic stratum of a clear majority of American adults, has steadily contracted in the past five decades. The share of adults who live in middle-class households fell from 61% in 1971 to 50% in 2021, according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of government data.

 

The shrinking of the middle class has been accompanied by an increase in the share of adults in the upper-income tier – from 14% in 1971 to 21% in 2021 – as well as an increase in the share who are in the lower-income tier, from 25% to 29%. These changes have occurred gradually, as the share of adults in the middle class decreased in each decade from 1971 to 2011, but then held steady through 2021.

The analysis below presents seven facts about how the economic status of the U.S. middle class and that of America’s major demographic groups have changed since 1971. A related analysis examines the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the financial well-being of households in the lower-, middle- and upper-income tiers, with comparisons to the Great Recession era. (In the source data for both analyses, demographic figures refer to the 1971-2021 period, while income figures refer to the 1970-2020 period. Thus, the shares of adults in an income tier are based on their household incomes in the previous year.)


How we did this


This report analyzes data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplements (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to study how the economic status of the American middle class has changed since 1971. It also examines the movement of demographic groups in and out of the American middle class and across lower- and upper-income tiers from 1971 to 2021.

The CPS is the U.S. government’s official source for monthly estimates of unemployment; the ASEC, conducted in March each year, is the official source for its estimates of income and poverty. The COVID-19 outbreak has affected data collection efforts by the U.S. government in its surveys, limiting in-person data collection and affecting the response rate. It is possible that some measures of economic outcomes and how they vary across demographic groups are affected by these changes in data collection. This report makes use of updated weights released by the Census Bureau to correct for nonresponse in 2019, 2020 and 2021.


Who is middle income or middle class?


In this analysis, “middle-income” adults in 2021 are those with an annual household income that was two-thirds to double the national median income in 2020, after incomes have been adjusted for household size, or about $52,000 to $156,000 annually in 2020 dollars for a household of three. “Lower-income” adults have household incomes less than $52,000 and “upper-income” adults have household incomes greater than $156,000.

The income it takes to be middle income varies by household size, with smaller households requiring less to support the same lifestyle as larger households. The boundaries of the income tiers also vary across years with changes in the national median income. Read the methodology for more details.

The terms “middle income” and “middle class” are used interchangeably in this analysis for the sake of exposition. But being middle class can refer to more than just income, be it the level of education, the type of profession, economic security, home ownership, or one’s social and political values. Class also could simply be a matter of self-identification.

Household incomes have risen considerably since 1970, but those of middle-class households have not climbed nearly as much as those of upper-income households. The median income of middle-class households in 2020 was 50% greater than in 1970 ($90,131 vs. $59,934), as measured in 2020 dollars. These gains were realized slowly, but for the most part steadily, with the exception of the period from 2000 to 2010, the so-called “lost decade,” when incomes fell across the board.

The median income for lower-income households grew more slowly than that of middle-class households, increasing from $20,604 in 1970 to $29,963 in 2020, or 45%.

The rise in income from 1970 to 2020 was steepest for upper-income households. Their median income increased 69% during that timespan, from $130,008 to $219,572.

As a result of these changes, the gap in the incomes of upper-income and other households also increased. In 2020, the median income of upper-income households was 7.3 times that of lower-income households, up from 6.3 in 1970. The median income of upper-income households was 2.4 times that of middle-income households in 2020, up from 2.2 in 1970.

The share of aggregate U.S. household income held by the middle class has fallen steadily since 1970. The widening of the income gap and the shrinking of the middle class has led to a steady decrease in the share of U.S. aggregate income held by middle-class households. In 1970, adults in middle-income households accounted for 62% of aggregate income, a share that fell to 42% in 2020.

Meanwhile, the share of aggregate income accounted for by upper-income households has increased steadily, from 29% in 1970 to 50% in 2020. Part of this increase reflects the rising share of adults who are in the upper-income tier.

The share of U.S. aggregate income held by lower-income households edged down from 10% to 8% over these five decades, even though the proportion of adults living in lower-income households increased over this period.

Older Americans and Black adults made the greatest progress up the income ladder from 1971 to 2021. Among adults overall, the share who were in the upper-income tier increased from 14% in 1971 to 21% in 2021, or by 7 percentage points. Meanwhile, the share in the lower-income tier increased from 25% to 29%, or by 4 points. On balance, this represented a net gain of 3 percentage points in income status for all adults.

Those ages 65 and older made the most notable progress up the income ladder from 1971 to 2021. They increased their share in the upper-income tier while reducing their share in the lower-income tier, resulting in a net gain of 25 points. Progress among adults 65 and older was likely driven by an increase in labor force participation, rising educational levels and by the role of Social Security payments in reducing poverty.

Black adults, as well as married men and women, were also among the biggest gainers from 1971 to 2021, with net increases ranging from 12 to 14 percentage points.

On the other hand, not having at least a bachelor’s degree resulted in a notable degree of economic regression over this period. Adults with a high school diploma or less education, as well as those with some college experience but no degree, saw sizable increases in their shares in the lower-income tier in the past five decades. Although no single group of adults by education category moved up the income ladder from 1971 to 2021, adults overall realized gains by boosting their education levels. The share of adults 25 and older who had completed at least four years of college stood at 38% in 2021, compared with only 11% in 1971.

Progress up the income ladder for a demographic group does not necessarily signal its economic status in comparison with other groups at a given point in time. For example, in 2021, adults ages 65 and older and Black adults were still more likely than many other groups to be lower income, and less likely to be middle or upper income.

Married adults and those in multi-earner households made more progress up the income ladder from 1971 to 2021 than their immediate counterparts. Generally, partnered adults have better outcomes on a range of economic outcomes than the unpartnered. One reason is that marriage is increasingly linked to educational attainment, which bears fruit in terms of higher incomes.

Married men and women were distributed across the income tiers identically to each other in both 1971 and 2021. Both groups nearly doubled their shares in the upper-income tier in the past five decades, from 14% in 1971 to 27% in 2021. And neither group experienced an increase in the share in the lower-income tier.

Unmarried men and women were much more likely than their married counterparts to be in the lower-income tier in 2021. And unmarried men, in particular, experienced a sizable increase in their share in the lower-income tier from 1971 t0 2021 and a similarly large decrease in their share in the middle-income tier. Nonetheless, unmarried men are less likely than unmarried women to be lower income and more likely to be middle income.

Adults in households with more than one earner fare much better economically than adults in households with only one earner. In 2021, some 20% of adults in multi-earner households were in the lower-income tier, compared with 53% of adults in single-earner households. Also, adults in multi-earner households were more than twice as likely as adults in single-earner households to be in the upper-income tier in 2021. In the long haul, adults in single-earner households are among the groups who slid down the income ladder the most from 1971 to 2021.

Despite progress, Black and Hispanic adults trail behind other groups in their economic status. Although Black adults made some of the biggest strides up the income tiers from 1971 to 2021, they, along with Hispanic adults, are more likely to be in the lower-income tier than are White or Asian adults. About 40% of both Black and Hispanic adults were lower income in 2021, compared with 24% of White adults and 22% of Asian adults.

Black adults are the only major racial and ethnic group that did not experience a decrease in its middle-class share, which stood at 47% in 2021, about the same as in 1971. White adults are the only group in which more than half (52%) lived in middle-class households in 2021, albeit after declining from 63% in 1971. At the top end, only about one-in-ten Black and Hispanic adults were upper income in 2021, compared with one-in-four or more White and Asian adults.

The relative economic status of men and women has changed little from 1971 to 2021. Both experienced similar percentage point increases in the shares in the lower- and upper-income tiers, and both saw double-digit decreases in the shares who are middle class. Women remained more likely than men to live in lower-income households in 2021 (31% vs. 26%).

Adults 65 and older continue to lag economically, despite decades of progress. The share of adults ages 65 and older in the lower-income tier fell from 54% in 1971 to 37% in 2021. Their share in the middle class rose from 39% to 47% and their share in the upper-income tier increased from 7% to 16%. However, adults 65 and older are the only age group in which more than one-in-three adults are in lower-income households, and they are much less likely than adults ages 30 to 44 – as well as those ages 45 to 64 – to be in the upper-income tier.

All other age groups experienced an increase in the shares who are lower income from 1971 to 2021, as well as a decrease in the shares who are middle income. But they also saw increases in the shares who are upper income. Among adults ages 30 to 44, for instance, the share in upper-income households almost doubled, from 12% in 1971 to 21% in 2021.

There is a sizable and growing income gap between adults with a bachelor’s degree and those with lower levels of education. In 2021, about four-in-ten adults with at least a bachelor’s degree (39%) were in the upper-income tier, compared with 16% or less among those without a bachelor’s degree. The share of adults in the upper-income tier with at least a bachelor’s degree edged up from 1971 to 2021, while the share without a bachelor’s degree either edged down or held constant.

About half or a little more of adults with either some college education or a high school diploma only were in the middle class in 2021. But these two groups, along with those with less than a high school education, experienced notable drops in their middle class shares from 1971 to 2021 – and notable increases in the shares in the lower-income tier. In 2021, about four-in-ten adults with only a high school diploma or its equivalent (39%) were in the lower-income tier, about double the share in 1971.

יום ראשון, 3 ביולי 2022

Youth vote and approval ratings of the Biden administration

 


 


Rubén Weinsteiner


Youth turnout in 2022 currently tracking record-breaking 2018 turnout; 55% of likely voters prefer Democratic control of Congress, 34% prefer Republican control. A majority disapprove of both parties’ performance in Congress amid weakening feelings of political efficacy

More than six months out, youth turnout in 2022 midterm elections is on track to match 2018 turnout, with 36% of young Americans reporting that they will “definitely” be voting compared to 37% at this stage in 2018.


Compared with Spring 2018 Harvard IOP polling, the composition of the electorate looks different. Young Democrats (38% of 18–29-year-olds) are less likely (-5 points) and young Republicans (25% of 18-29-year-olds) are more likely (+7) to vote at this stage. While interest among white and Hispanic voters did not change significantly, young Asian American and Pacific Islander voters show increased interest (+13), while young Black Americans show significantly less interest in voting (-13) than they did at this point in the 2018 midterm election cycle.


Overall, 40% of Americans under 30 prefer Democrats maintain control of Congress, while 28% prefer Republicans; 32% are unsure. This +12-point margin for Democrats widens to +21 when the lens is narrowed to likely voters. Among likely voters who are unaffiliated or independent, Democrats lead +14, with more than a quarter (27%) undecided.


A warning sign that interest in voting in the 2022 midterms could wane, we found a sharp decrease relative to Spring 2018 in attitudes related to the efficacy of voting and political engagement relative. For example:

The percentage of youth agreeing that “political involvement rarely has any tangible results” has risen from 22% in 2018 to 36% in 2022.


Agreement with the statement “I don’t believe my vote will make a real difference,” increased from 31% in 2018 to 42% in 2022.


Agreement that “politics today are no longer able to meet the challenges our country is facing,” increased from 45% in 2018 to 56% in 2022.


2. 41% of young Americans approve of President Biden’s job performance overall; A majority (52%) approve of his handling of the pandemic, 46% approve of his performance regarding Ukraine –​ but only one-in-three approve of how the President is handling the economy (34%)

At 41%, President Biden’s job approval among young Americans is down 18 percentage points since Spring 2021 (59%) and five points since the last Harvard IOP youth poll release in Fall 2021 (46%). Seventy percent (70%) of young Democrats now approve of President Biden’s job performance (-5 since Fall 2021), as compared to 33% of independents (-6) and 11% of Republicans (+2). For comparison, President Trump’s approval was 25% at this stage in the 2018 midterm cycle and President Obama’s approval was 56% in the Spring of 2010.


The leading reason cited for disapproval of Biden is “ineffectiveness” (36%), which leads other options provided to respondents such as “not following through on campaign promises” (14%) and “not sharing my values” (10%).


Nearly half (49%) of young Americans believe that things in the nation are off on the wrong track, with only 13% saying they are headed in the right direction. This stands in contrast to the Spring 2021 survey where about one-third (35%) believed things were headed off on the wrong track, and 26% said right direction.


Two-in-five (40%) young Democrats indicate they want to see and hear more from President Biden, compared to 21% of Republicans and 18% of independents who say the same.

 Half of young Americans believe the GOP cares more about “the interests of the elite” than for people like them (21%); a plurality (39%) say the same about Democrats; 3-in-5 see the other party as a threat to democracy

Forty percent (40%) of young Americans approve of the job performance of Democrats in Congress, 31% approve of the job that Republicans are doing in Congress. These ratings are virtually unchanged since the Fall 2021 survey (Democrats -2, Republicans even).


By a double-digit margin (-11), young Americans believe the Democratic party cares more about serving the interests of the elite (39%) than young people like them (28%). Among likely voters in the Fall midterm, the margin is -10, and it swells to -25 among likely voters who are white, -19 among likely male voters, and -17 among likely voters without a college degree or experience.


Current perceptions of the Republican party are more negative as 51% of young Americans under 30 believe the GOP cares more about the elite than serving the interests of people like them (21%). This -30-point margin is triple the Democratic party’s deficit and rises to -38 among likely voters. Across every major demographic subgroup, more youth believe Republicans favor the elite. Among likely young voters who are men, the margin is -27, among women it is -55, and among likely white voters the margin is -34.


The survey found that 59% of young Democrats and 61% of young Republicans see the other party as a threat to democracy. Among likely voters, 74% of Democrats and 68% of Republicans saw the other party as a threat to democracy.


In an open-ended question about which part of their identity they consider most when voting, we found notable differences between Democrats and Republicans. Democrats are more likely to consider gender, race, ethnicity, and sexual identity, while Republicans are more likely to consider religion, faith, political and party preferences when voting.

Young Americans, across demographic and partisan divides, are overwhelmingly comfortable with a close friend coming out as LGBTQ; steady support charted for more than a decade

Nearly three-quarters (72%) of young Americans report they are either “very” or “somewhat” comfortable with a close friend coming out as LGBTQ. The poll finds that 84% of Democrats, 53% of Republicans and 74% of independents are comfortable, as are 68% of males, 76% of females, 72% of young Catholics, and 61% of young Evangelical or Fundamentalist Christians.


The poll also found widespread support of close friends who are transitioning and for the use of they/them pronouns, but strong partisan divides emerge:

61% of young Americans are comfortable with a close friend transitioning from one gender to another (77% Democrat, 33% Republican, 64% independent);


56% of young Americans are comfortable with using they/them pronouns (73% Democrat, 32% Republican, 54% independent); and


46% are comfortable with transgender athletes participating in sports (65% Democrat, 20% Republican, 44% independent).


Over the last decade, overall acceptance for same-sex relationships has increased significantly among young Americans. In 2011, a quarter (25%) indicated such relationships were morally wrong, 42% disagreed, while 29% were unsure (net difference 17 points). Now, more than a decade later, we found that 23% find them morally wrong, with 52% disagreeing with this viewpoint (and 24% unsure), which indicates growing support for LGBTQ-identifying peers (net difference 29).

Despite growing acceptance of LGBTQ-identifying youth, nearly half (45%) of LGBTQ youth feel under attack “a lot” because of their sexual orientation and are nearly three times as likely as straight youth (LGBTQ: 28%, Straight: 11%) to be uncomfortable expressing their identity and true self with family.

About one-in-five young 18-to-29-year-olds identify as LGBTQ (21%) – of which 45% report feeling under “a lot” of attack in America because of their sexual orientation. Of the 79% of straight-identifying youth in our poll, nearly one-fifth (18%) feel under “a lot” of attack for similar reasons.


Only about one-third (34%) of LGBTQ youth feel “very comfortable” expressing their true selves with family, while 61% of straight youth feel the same way; another 36% of LGBTQ youth and 24% of straight youth say they feel “somewhat comfortable.” Time with family represents the only major difference between LGBTQ and straight youth on a battery of questions that probed other personal and professional areas. For example:

60% of LGBTQ youth and 55% of straight youth are very comfortable expressing their identity with friends;


32% of LGBTQ youth and 29% of straight youth are very comfortable expressing their identity at school;


30% of LGBTQ youth and 22% of straight youth are very comfortable expressing their identity on social media;


25% of LGBTQ youth and 31% of straight youth are very comfortable expressing their identity at work.


When the same battery of questions is filtered through political party, we find young Republicans (68%) are more likely than Democrats (53%) to feel “very comfortable” expressing their identity with family, but no other partisan differences emerge when asked about friends, social media, school, or work.

 Large proportions of minority groups in the United States – representing race, religion, politics, and sexuality – feel under attack in America

Three-fifths (59%) of young Black Americans believe people of their racial background are under “a lot” of attack in America, 43% of AAPI youth, 37% of Hispanics, and 19% of whites feel the same. Compared to Spring 2017, the percent of young Blacks who feel under “a lot” of attack for their race has stayed relatively constant (2017: 62%), and for young Hispanics, the proportion who felt under “a lot” of attack for their race decreased from 46% to 37%.


Despite small sample sizes, we find that young Muslims, Jews, and Evangelical Christians are more likely to say people with their religious beliefs are under attack “a lot” when compared to Protestants and Catholics.


As noted above, 45% of LGBTQ-identifying youth feel like people with their sexual orientation are under attack “a lot.”


Nearly half of young Republicans (46%) believe that people who hold their political views are under attack “a lot” in America, compared to 24% of Democrats who feel the same way.

Second to the economy, young Americans rank education as more important to America’s future global strength than the military, technology, or democracy; still, only one-third (34%) are satisfied with the current state of K-12 public education

Overall, 50% of young Americans ranked education as one of the two most important factors to America’s global strength in the future; fewer Republicans (39%) rated education as one of the top two factors than Democrats (54%); Democrats ranked education first among all factors, including above the economy.


While only 34% of 18-to-29-year-olds express satisfaction with the public education system, 57% were satisfied with the quality of their own K-12 education. Satisfaction tracked closely with higher educational attainment, with 67% of college graduates reporting satisfaction versus 51% of those with high school degrees only. Additionally, we found that registered voters (62%) were more satisfied with their education than others (48%), as were those living in suburbs (61%) compared to urban (55%), small town (55%) and rural (52%) residents.


A strong majority (58%) of young Americans believe that “K-12 public schools should teach what is morally right and wrong,” and only 13% disagreed (28% neither agreed nor disagreed) with almost no variation across demographic, educational, or party lines. For example, 62% of young Americans who voted for Joe Biden agreed with that sentiment compared to 61% of Trump voters.
By 2-to-1 margins, young Americans are supportive of greater parental control over education and candidates that support teaching K-12 students that racism – intentional or not – is a fixture of American laws and institutions

Nearly half of young Americans (46%) agree with the statement that “parents should have more control over their children’s education than they do now,” while 23% disagreed. While Democrats are slightly more likely to agree (35%) than disagree, (31%) one-third (33%) chose the “neither agree nor disagree” option. Support for greater parental involvement is overwhelming for Republicans (64% agree, 14% disagree) and strong for independent and unaffiliated young voters (44% agree, 20% disagree) as well.


Approximately half of the survey respondents were asked their level of agreement with the statement that they “would vote for a candidate who supports K-12 public schools teaching that racism – intentional or not – is a fixture of American laws and institutions,” while the other half were asked about agreement with “I would vote for a candidate who supports K-12 public schools teaching critical race theory. In both cases, support for teaching about systemic racism was 2:1 (46%-22% when critical race theory was not mentioned and 44%-22% with critical race theory mentioned).


Regardless of question-wording, young white voters supported teaching K-12 students about the history of race in America. The divides among parties were prominent: 70% of Democrats under 30 were supportive of candidates who support teaching that racism is a fixture of American laws and institutions, compared to 23% of Republicans and a plurality of independents (37%). Support for candidates in favor of teaching “critical race theory” without a further definition: Democrats 63%, Republicans 22%, independents 38%.

 85% of young Americans favor some form of government action on student loan debt, but only 38% favor total debt cancellation

Though nearly nine-in-ten young Americans under 30 agree that action is needed, young Americans had no clear consensus on a path forward related to student loan debt. A plurality favors full debt cancellation (38%), while 27% favor government assisting with repayment options without any debt cancellation, and 21% favor debt cancellation for those with the most need. Only 13% believe the government should not change current policy. Since 2020, support for full cancellation increased 5 percentage points, while preference for the government helping with repayment decreased 8 points.


Opinions on this issue do not differ significantly among likely voters in the 2022 midterms compared to the broader population of 18-to-29-year-olds as 83% of young likely voters express a preference for government action, including 79% of those not in college now, and without a degree.


Among Democrats likely to vote in November:

43% favor canceling student loan debt for everyone


29% favor canceling student loan debt for only those most in need


19% favor not canceling debt, but helping with repayment options


4% favor not changing the current policy


For Republicans likely to vote in November:

13% favor canceling student loan debt for everyone


11% favor canceling student loan debt for only those most in need


39% favor not canceling debt, but helping with repayment options


36% favor not changing the current policy


For independents likely to vote in November:

38% favor canceling student loan debt for everyone


18% favor canceling student loan debt for only those most in need


30% favor not canceling debt, but helping with repayment options


14% favor not changing the current policy


A majority (54%) of white Americans and 49% of Asian Americans under 30 “strongly” agreed with the statement “I grew up thinking it was possible for me to go to college,” compared to only 32% of Blacks and 38% of Hispanics under 30. Overall, 47% of all young Americans strongly agreed with the statement, while an additional 23% somewhat agreed (total agreement 71% with rounding).


Asked whether they agree with the statement, “Going to college is worth the time and money,” we find 48% of young Americans agreed (but only 18% strongly agreed), 26% disagreed, and 24% chose a neutral position. Sixty-two percent (62%) of college students and 61% of college graduates agree with this sentiment.
About half (51%) of young Americans with recent thoughts of self-harm and 61% of those with depression indicate they have support or resources to help them deal; significant differences exist based on race

Fifty-seven percent (57%) of whites suffering from thoughts of self-harm have access to support or resources, while only 40% of Blacks say the same.


Among those suffering from bouts of depression or hopelessness, 61% say they have access to support, but that number dips to 48% for Blacks, compared to 68% of young whites.


When young Americans suffering from depression or hopelessness were asked their interest in several potential support services and resources, we found the most interest in spending time outside (50% interested), support of family and friends (47%), and sports or exercise (43%). Additionally, we found that nearly two-fifths (38%) were interested in professional therapy, followed by meditation (29%), prescription medication (26%), church or religion (18%), alcohol or recreational drugs (18%), and support by authority figures (8%).


12. Nearly half of young Americans report that politics and news media have had negative impacts on their mental health; feelings about school and work are more positive

Nearly half of 18-to-29-year-olds (45%) report that politics has had a negative impact on their mental health and only 13% report a positive impact. Among those who identify as LGBTQ, the rate is nearly two-thirds (64%), while 42% for straight youth. Young Americans who do not identify with a major party are more likely than others (17% independent, 12% Democrat, 11% Republican) to say that politics has had a very negative impact on their mental health.


Similarly, 46% report that the news media have a negative impact on their mental health.


Nearly two-in-five (37%) report that social media has a negative impact on their mental health, while 22% report a positive impact and 39% report no effect. There is no statistical difference based on age, but we found that young women (42%) were somewhat more likely to cite negative mental health effects of social media than young men (35%).


On the other hand, 45% report that work has had a positive impact on their mental health and only 21% report a negative impact. The fact that over three-quarters of young Americans find that work does not have a negative impact on their mental health accords with a finding from the Fall 2021 survey, in which 72% of respondents said that, outside of compensation, they find “some” or “a lot” of meaning in their work.


High school experience, while nearly as likely to have a positive impact, is more polarizing: 42% report that school has had a positive impact but 34% report that it has had a negative one.


About half (51%) of young Americans with recent thoughts of self-harm and 61% of those with depression indicate they have support or resources to help them deal; significant differences exist based on race

Fifty-seven percent (57%) of whites suffering from thoughts of self-harm have access to support or resources, while only 40% of Blacks say the same.


Among those suffering from bouts of depression or hopelessness, 61% say they have access to support, but that number dips to 48% for Blacks, compared to 68% of young whites.


When young Americans suffering from depression or hopelessness were asked their interest in several potential support services and resources, we found the most interest in spending time outside (50% interested), support of family and friends (47%), and sports or exercise (43%). Additionally, we found that nearly two-fifths (38%) were interested in professional therapy, followed by meditation (29%), prescription medication (26%), church or religion (18%), alcohol or recreational drugs (18%), and support by authority figures (8%).


12. Nearly half of young Americans report that politics and news media have had negative impacts on their mental health; feelings about school and work are more positive

Nearly half of 18-to-29-year-olds (45%) report that politics has had a negative impact on their mental health and only 13% report a positive impact. Among those who identify as LGBTQ, the rate is nearly two-thirds (64%), while 42% for straight youth. Young Americans who do not identify with a major party are more likely than others (17% independent, 12% Democrat, 11% Republican) to say that politics has had a very negative impact on their mental health.


Similarly, 46% report that the news media have a negative impact on their mental health.


Nearly two-in-five (37%) report that social media has a negative impact on their mental health, while 22% report a positive impact and 39% report no effect. There is no statistical difference based on age, but we found that young women (42%) were somewhat more likely to cite negative mental health effects of social media than young men (35%).


On the other hand, 45% report that work has had a positive impact on their mental health and only 21% report a negative impact. The fact that over three-quarters of young Americans find that work does not have a negative impact on their mental health accords with a finding from the Fall 2021 survey, in which 72% of respondents said that, outside of compensation, they find “some” or “a lot” of meaning in their work.


High school experience, while nearly as likely to have a positive impact, is more polarizing: 42% report that school has had a positive impact but 34% report that it has had a negative one.


 

Rubén Weinsteiner